Case summaries
A decision to transfer the applicant to Italy, solely based on Italy’s failure to respond to a request to take back the applicant, was insufficient, arbitrary and violated the applicant’s right to equal treatment. The Asylum Court had neither listed any criteria of the Dublin II Regulation that would indicate that Italy was responsible nor addressed the issues concerning the travel route of the applicant and his long stay in Greece.
The applicant stated that he had been a member of the Taliban amongst other things. The Federal Asylum Agency (BAA) declared that the expulsion of the applicant to Afghanistan was permissible. The Asylum Court acted on the assumption of the existence of the ground for exclusion from asylum of ”Crimes against humanity“ and therefore granted neither asylum nor subsidiary protection, but revoked the expulsion to Afghanistan. The Constitutional Court allowed the appeal by the applicant against this decision as sufficient findings were not established in relation to the assumed crime against humanity.
There is not currently an indiscriminate conflict in Afghanistan (as a whole, or in any province) within the meaning of Article 15(c). Internal protection is in general possible in Kabul; however it is unreasonable to expect certain categories of women to seek internal protection within Afghanistan.
The case concerns a recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom, who was to be deported in the interests of national security to Jordan. The UK Government obtained assurances from Jordan that he would not be subjected to ill-treatment and would be tried fairly by the Jordanian State Security Court. However the applicant alleged that, if deported to Jordan, he would be at real risk of ill-treatment and an unfair trial.
In an application for judicial review, the High Court found that the Minister had not erred in relying on the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) finding as to credibility in a case where the Applicant’s claimed conversion from Islam to Christianity was found to have been in bad faith and solely in order to ground his applications for international protection. As the ‘conversion’ was not genuine, the Court held that there was no reason to believe it would come to the notice of the Afghani authorities should the Applicant be returned. This rendered it unnecessary to subsequently consider whether the Applicant would be at risk of serious harm by the authorities.
The Afghan applicant was granted subsidiary protection status during the court proceedings. The authority must make sure that the applicant is not at risk of serious harm or persecution in the relevant part of the country, not only at the time the application is assessed but also that this is not likely to occur in the future either. Countries struggling with armed conflicts do not normally provide safe internal flight options within the country, as the movement of front lines can put areas at risk that were previously considered safe.
The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.
The Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic may not revoke subsidiary protection in a procedure on extension of subsidiary protection initiated under Section 20(3) of the Asylum Act on the basis of an application to extend protection.
Under Section 20(3) of the Asylum Act, the procedure may result only in a decision to extend or not to extend protection.
This case concerns the State’s obligation to attempt to trace the family members of unaccompanied minor asylum seekers.
Under Austrian Asylum law, if a minor age cannot be excluded following an age assessment and doubts still exist in favour of the applicant, the authorities have to treat him or her as a minor. In this case, the age of the applicant had not been confirmed as being the age of maturity with absolute certainty and the applicant should therefore have been treated as a minor. The fact that only a copy of the birth certificate was submitted is not a sufficient basis to doubt its authenticity.