UK - Upper Tribunal, 28 November 2011, AMM and others v Secretary of state for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 00445
| Country of Decision: | United Kingdom |
| Country of applicant: | Somalia |
| Court name: | Upper Tribunal (Immigration & Asylum Chamber) |
| Date of decision: | 28-11-2011 |
| Citation: | [2011] UKUT 00445 |
Keywords:
| Keywords |
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Armed conflict
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Description
A dispute involving the use of armed force between two or more parties. International Humanitarian law distinguishes between international and non-international armed conflicts.“An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state”. |
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Burden of proof
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Description
"In the migration context, a non-national seeking entry into a foreign State must prove that he or she is entitled to enter and is not inadmissible under the laws of that State. In refugee status procedures, where an applicant must establish his or her case, i.e. show on the evidence that he or she has well-founded fear of persecution. Note: A broader definition may be found in the Oxford Dictionary of Law." |
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Credibility assessment
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Description
Assessment made in adjudicating an application for a visa, or other immigration status, in order to determine whether the information presented by the applicant is consistent and credible. |
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Indiscriminate violence
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Description
Violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict which presents a serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person for the purposes of determining the risk of serious harm in the context of qualification for subsidiary protection status under QD Art. 15(c). |
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Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
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Description
A form of serious harm for the purposes of the granting of subsidiary protection. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Celibici defined cruel or inhuman treatment as ‘an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, that causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.’ “Ill-treatment means all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including corporal punishment, which deprives the individual of its physical and mental integrity." |
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Persecution Grounds/Reasons
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Description
Per Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention, one element of the refugee definition is that the persecution feared is “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion“. Member States must take a number of elements into account when assessing the reasons for persecution as per Article 10 of the Qualification Directive. |
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Serious harm
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Description
In order to be eligible for subsidiary protection, a third country national or stateless person must demonstrate that if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, s/he would face a real risk of serious harm as defined in QD Art. 15 and that s/he is unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail her/himself of the protection of that country. Per Art.15:"(a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict." “Risks to which a population of a country or a section of the population is generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify as serious harm.” |
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Subsidiary Protection
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Description
The protection given to a third-country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15 of 2004/83/EC, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) of 2004/83/EC do not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.” “Note: The UK has opted into the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) but does not (legally) use the term Subsidiary Protection. It is believed that the inclusion of Humanitarian Protection within the UK Immigration rules fully transposes the Subsidiary Protection provisions of the Qualification Directive into UK law. |
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Religion
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Description
One of the grounds of persecution specified in the refugee definition under Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention. According to the Qualification Directive, the concept of religion includes in particular the holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief. |
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Internal armed conflict
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Description
“A conflict in which government forces are fighting with armed insurgents, or armed groups are fighting amongst themselves.” |
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Individual threat
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Description
An individual threat to a civilian's life or person must be proven in order to establish the serious harm required before an applicant will be eligible for subsidiary protection status on the grounds set out in QD Art. 15(c). “Risks to which a population of a country or a section of the population is generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify as serious harm.” |
Headnote:
In this case the Tribunal considered the general country situation in Somalia as at the date of decision for five applicants, both men and women from Mogadishu, south or central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. The risk of female genital mutilation (FGM) was also considered.
Facts:
AMM was from Jowhar, as was the applicant AM in the case HH (Somalia) & Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 42 (HH), whose appeal was remitted to the Tribunal from the Court of Appeal.
MW was a woman from a majority clan and had been granted discretionary leave to remain with her husband and British children but was pursuing a claim against refusal of asylum and humanitarian protection.
ZF was a sixty six year old woman and was not believed to be a member of the REER Hamar minority clan and on the basis of a linguistic analysis was found to be from North west Somalia, Somaliland - although it was found that she may have spent time in Mogadishu. Following the decision in HH, the Tribunal was obliged to consider whether she could safely travel to Somaliland.
FM was a man from Hamar JaabJab district of Mogadishu. An immigration Judge had suggested that he could relocate internally but did not specify where and his case was remitted from the Court of Appeal for fresh consideration by the Tribunal.
AF was a member of the Midgan (Madhiban) minority clan, came from the coastal city of Merka which is about 70 kilometres south of Mogadishu. It was also accepted that he had lived in Mogadishu, including in the Hamar Weyne and Hamar JadJab districts during periods of intense fighting. Although he had suffered harm, previous Immigration Judges had decided that the harm did not constitute persecution.
While the cases were pending the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down judgment in Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom (Applications nos. 8319/07 & 11449/07) on Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court found that removal of Sufi or Elmi from the United Kingdom would breach their Art 3 rights. At the time of AMM’s appeal, Sufi and Elmi was not the final judgment and the Secretary of State still hoped to influence the final judgment.
UNHCR acted as interveners.
Decision & reasoning:
The Tribunal supplied its own summary of the legal findings at the head of the decision.
At the outset the Tribunal considered the “significance” of Sufi and Elmi, but more generally the rulings of the ECtHR. Having considered the domestic authorities the Tribunal decided that although United Kingdom Courts were bound to be guided by the standards for assessing country of origin evidence as established in NA v United Kingdom (Application no. 25904/07) (summarised as accuracy, independence, reliability, objectivity, reputation, adequacy or methodology, consistency and corroboration), they were not bound to adopt the factual findings of the European Court when the factual evidence before them differed from that before the European Court. The additional evidence came from the UKBA’s Country of Origin Information Service’s “Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi” in September 2010 and a “Fact Finding Mission” undertaken by FM and AF’s solicitors in May 2011.
The Tribunal observed that more extensive evidence was available to it than was considered by the ECtHR and so it was entitled to attribute weight and make its own findings of fact in these cases, which otherwise would have been disposed of by reference to Sufi and Elmi.
The Tribunal received the submissions of UNHCR but reiterated the view that it was not bound to accept UNHCR’s recommendation that at the time of hearing nobody should be returned to central and southern Somalia.
The Tribunal made general findings in relation to the 1951 Refugee Convention principally focussed on whether persecution would be by reason of religion.
The Tribunal rejected submissions that the restrictions on personal and social activity imposed by Al Shabab amounted to persecution for reasons of religion but accepted that any punishment meted out by Al Shabab to those who transgressed their social rules would amount to persecution because according to the Takfiri Doctrine followed by Al Shabab, Muslims who transgress are to be considered apostates.
The Tribunal, following Sepet and Bulbul, accepted that in principle an application could be based on a conscientious objection to paying “taxes” which supported Al Shabab, which is listed as terrorist organisation by the UK.
It was also accepted, applying current UK authority RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1285 that subject to findings of fact as to the severity of the punishment or threats from Al Shabab “Every person living [pre-flight] under Al-Shabab control in central and southern Somalia, who could show that they do not genuinely adhere to that organisation’s ethos, would have a good claim to Refugee Convention protection…”
On the issue of internal flight the Tribunal found that Art 8 of the Qualification Directive was not helpful in allocating the burden of proof but affirmed the position in domestic law that the burden of proof always lay on the applicant, but that in practice to be fair, the possibility of a safe internal refuge should be raised in the administrative letter refusing asylum or humanitarian protection or during the appellate process.
MW’s case was that if she were to be expelled it was reasonably likely that she would be accompanied by her daughter who would be at risk of FGM, even though the child was not subject to removal. The Tribunal referred to domestic law which referred to the duty of the state to ensure that its international obligations were not breached and ruled that if it was reasonably likely that the child would accompany her mother and would be subject to harm, then the anguish experienced by the mother was a relevant consideration. No authority was cited for this finding.
The evidence had disclosed that MW had said that she would permit her daughter to be subjected to FGM to avoid social abuse.The Tribunal doubted that the member states of the EU or signatories to the Refugee Convention intended to provide protection to potential persecutors. The exclusion clauses strongly suggested the contrary.
Art 15 Risk in Mogadishu
After a long summary of the evidence and submissions the Tribunal concluded that at the date of decision “an Art 15 (c) risk exists, as a general matter, in respect of the majority of those in Mogadishu and, as a general matter, as to those returning there from the United Kingdom.” The Tribunal did identify a category of people who might exceptionally be able to avoid Art 15 (c) risk. These were people with connections to the “powerful actors” in the TFG/AMISOM.
At the date of decision, bearing in mind Al Shabab’s withdrawal from Mogadishu, the Tribunal found that there was not a generalised risk of Art 3 (Art 15 (b)) harm. In individual cases the threshold may be crossed e.g. a female headed household with children, which had no connections in Mogadishu.
The Tribunal noted the absence of evidence relating to the targeting of minority clans, albeit acknowledging that there was still discrimination and concluded that there was no evidence of a risk of persecution by reason of being a member of a minority clan in Mogadishu.
Art 15 Central and Southern Somalia
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the conditions would place civilians at risk of Art 15(c) mistreatment. The Tribunal was satisfied that a returnee to southern or central Somalia would be at risk of harm which would breach Art 3 of ECHR, but reached its conclusion by a different route and on different evidence from that taken in Sufi and Elmi.
Internal Relocation
Given the general findings on risk of persecution (Art 2 of the Qualification Directive ) and serious harm (Art 15) there was a similar finding that internal flight to Mogadishu or to any other area would not be reasonable.
Safe Internal Route
From Mogadishu international airport to the city, notwithstanding the risk of improvised explosive devices, was considered safe under TFG / AMISOM control. There may be safe air routes, but overland travel by road was not safe if it entailed going into an area controlled by Al Shabab. Safety and reasonableness would also be gauged by reference to the current famine. Individuals may be able to show increased risk e.g. women who were not accompanied by a protecting male.
FGM
In general, an uncircumcised, unmarried Somali woman, up to the age of 39, would be at real risk of suffering FGM.
Outcome:
AMM succeeded under the Refugee Convention. He also demonstrated that he was at risk of Art 3 ECHR harm (Qualification Directive Art 15 (b)) by reference to the risk from Al Shabab.
MW succeeded under the Refugee Convention (Qualification Directive Art 2) she had demonstrated that she was -at risk from Al Shabab, and similarly established a risk under Art 3 (Qualification Directive Art 15(b)).
ZF succeeded under the Refugee Convention.
FM’s claims to be a Refugee and to be at risk of Art 15 (b) harm were dismissed, but he succeeded on his Art 15 (c) claim.
AF also failed under the Refugee Convention and Article 15(b) but succeeded under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive.
Observations/comments:
The Tribunal commented extensively on the difficulties of return to Somaliland and Puntland in paragraphs 525-546 given the reluctance of the authorities to admit those without proven connections to the area and the difficulties associated with the required documentation.
The Tribunal gives its own summary of the “guidance aspects” of the determination which may obviate the need to read the extensive record of the evidence which may soon be of historic interest only.
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited Cases:
Follower Cases:
Other sources:
Practice Direction 12 of the Senior President of the Tribunal’s Directions of 10 February 2010
Art 1(A) Organisation of African Unity Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1969.
Symes and Jorro Asylum Law and Practice, 2nd Edition.