Case summaries
The lower Court could not have carried out a more critical analysis, especially since there was no evidence, since the applicant’s entire claim was based on personal reasons.
The Court recognised self-defence in a case where migrants were charged with assault against a police officer following their rescue at sea and their impending return to Libya. Their well-founded fear of return to Libya provided the basis for their defence of duress.
The transfer of a family to the previous country of entry (Bulgaria), which might entail the risk of refoulement to the country of origin (Afghanistan), would cause an irreversible and serious harm; it ordered the suspension of the transfer decision until the final decision, on the annulment of the rejection of the application on the refugee status, was issued.
The Court decides that Greece is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s claim for international protection. The Court does not find that asylum procedures in Greece are flawed and that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman and degrading reception conditions. Moreover, neither the fact that the applicant’s sister is living in Germany nor the purpose of medical and psychological support in a Member State entitles the applicant under the Dublin Regulation to choose which country will examine his application for international protection.
LGBT individuals who have left Morocco can be granted refugee status as the socially and legally hostile environment towards LGBT individuals in this country can justify fear of persecution based on their membership to a particular group. A cautious assessment of the consequences of a return to the country of origin and an extensive benefit of the doubt are advised in the review of asylum applications of Moroccan nationals identifying as LGBT.
There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state.
Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.
The discretionary clause in Art. 17 II Dublin-III regulation might under certain circumstances oblige the member states to take charge of an applicant. This can be particularly the case, if the competence of the member state under chapter III of the Dublin-III regulation would not be given because of a deadline expiry the applicant had no influence on.
This appeal considered what the correct approach is to the assessment of medical evidence in asylum claims alleging torture. Hence, it was declared that decision-makers can receive assistance from medical experts who are able to offer an opinion about the injury inflicted. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted KV’s appeal against the refusal of asylum to the Upper Tribunal for fresh determination.