Case summaries

When assessing the legal requirement that a Belgian spouse has to prove that he/she has means of subsistence which are “stable, regular and sufficient”, the applicant’s financial means can be taken into consideration [because according to art. 221.1 and 2 of the Civil Code the Belgian spouse is capable of legally disposing of the applicant’s financial means].

This case is concerned with whether an appeal against the lawfulness of an asylum applicant’s detention was allowed. Thus the prejudicial question was formulated questioning whether the measure under article 8(3)(a-b) recast Reception Conditions Directive is valid with regards to the provisions in Article 6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) subject to Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The extension of a transfer time limit in accordance with Article 20(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (“Dublin II”) does not create a new decision to transfer the Applicant to the responsible Member State, but has the effect of maintaining in force the initial transfer decision.

A judgment which cancels a detention measure based on Article L. 551-1 of the French Code for the Entry and Residence of Foreigners in France and of Asylum Right (“FCERFFAR”) on the grounds that the extension of the transfer time limit has not been notified to the Applicant in accordance with the formal requirements provided for in the initial decision to transfer, must be void.

A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.

The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.

The presence of laws criminalising homosexuality does not amount to persecution within the meaning of article 9, Directive 2011/95/EU when there is no real risk for gay men to be prosecuted on the basis of these laws. A gay man in Algeria may reasonably be expected to relocate within the country in order to avoid persecution from his family members, and to conceal his sexual identity so as to conform to societal pressures falling short of acts of persecution.

The case dealt primarily with the standard of reasoning required in credibility assessment among other issues (travel findings and best interests of the child). In quashing the RAT decision, the High Court ruled that the RAT had not met the standard of reasoning required in assessment of the credibility of oral testimony (as established in the jurisprudence of the Court and EU law), reiterating the obligation upon the decision maker to ensure that each negative credibility finding is accompanied by an adequate rationale clearly outlining the reasons for such findings.

When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.

The case shows how the legal amendment which entered into force on 13 November 2015 changed the situation of asylum seekers by deleting the legal basis for detention formulated as “preventing from abusing the asylum proceedings”. Instead, article 87 (1) (3) of the Law on granting protection to foreigners in the territory of the Republic of Poland reflects article 8 (3)(d) of the recast Reception Directive and states that an applicant can be detained in order to issue or enforce the return decision if towards the applicant there is an ongoing return proceedings or there was a return decision issued and the applicant already had the opportunity to access the asylum procedure, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the application was merely made in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision.

The Border Guard relied on this provision when prolonging the detention of the applicant in the present case arguing it with the need to secure the proceedings regarding international protection. In the opinion of the Court, this provision cannot be used in the situation where the applicant is not subject to return proceedings and no such decision has been issued so far. That is why he should be released.

It is a material prerequisite for the permissibility of a Dublin transfer of a family with children to Italy under international law to seek an individual guarantee that they will be provided with an accommodation that is appropriate for children and respects the unity of the family. This prerequisite of an individual assurance also requires it to be up to date.

A transfer decision that relies on a six months old general assurance of the Italian authorities that appropriate accommodation will be provided for, indicating the number of available places in the regions of Sicily and Calabria does not meet this requirement. Furthermore, a guarantee that does not give the names and ages of the individuals concerned is not concrete enough. 

In appealing against the Migration Agency’s and the Migration Court’s rejections of the Applicant’s application for leave to remain in Sweden, the Applicant claimed grounds for protection which he/she had not previously raised before the Migration Agency. Claiming grounds for protection meant that special requirements for asylum applications applied and the Applicant was entitled to a personal interview before the Migration Agency. The Migration Court of Appeal referred the Applicant’s case back to the Migration Agency as the Migration Court could not be the body to try the asylum application in the first instance.