Case summaries

Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department  that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters.  However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision. 

Judicial review to challenge the failure/refusal of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SoS”) to determine the application of the applicant’s spouse and two youngest children for family reunification in the UK on the following grounds: a failure to apply the SoS published policy; irrationality; breach of all the family members’ rights under Art. 8 ECHR; and (regarding the two children in the UK), breach of the duties owed under s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”).

The Upper Tribunal found that:

1) the Home Office family reunification policy embraces a series of flexible possibilities for proof of identity;

2) the reunion applications were not examined and determined which involves a public law misdemeanour within the applicant’s grounds for challenge; and

3) in any case where withdrawal or a consent order is proposed judicial scrutiny and adjudication are required.

Where an asylum application is made by an unaccompanied child, the tribunal must take into consideration the best interests of the child in its examination (for example, education). The decision includes a presumption of minority that the tribunal must rebut in order to allow for the transfer of the applicant. 

The fact that the membership of a particular social group is not subject to specific repressive criminal provisions has no incidence on the granting of refugee status.

An application to suspend the effects of a decision, contained in an appeal of a decision ordering return and a ban from re-entering the territory of Poland and other Schengen area states should be allowed, due to the validity of the Applicant remaining in Poland pending the conclusion of the administrative court proceedings. Under art. 61 § 3 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, the Court may, upon the application of the Appellant, order that the challenged decision be suspended, in whole or in part, if the act or function to be performed would result in a risk of significant harm or other consequences which are difficult to reverse.

The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention could mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since a non-suspensive appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.

As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.

The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention would mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since an appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.

As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.

Article 17 forms an integral part of the Dublin Regulation and should be applied in a manner which furthers the aims and objectives of the Regulation in general. Article 17 is a justiciable right and should be particularly relied upon in circumstances where one of the overarching values of the Dublin Regulation, namely expedition, is not being fulfilled in the procedures of the host Member State. Article 17 is not subject to a prior assessment of non-satisfaction of Article 8 (family reunification) of that same Regulation.

Applicants who engaged with Dublin authorities should be subjected to less onerous standards when assessing the success of an Article 8 ECHR claim.

The UK Upper Tribunal held that there had been a failure of the Secretary of State to lawfully exercise the discretion conferred by Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation and ordered the Secretary of State to admit the applicant to the UK, based on: (1) the deficiencies of the Italian asylum system in the present case, namely the lack of sufficient expedition to register the asylum application and initiate Dublin proceedings; (2) the deficiencies and delay in the guardianship system in Italy; (3) the expected lengthy procedures for a “take charge” request and subsequent Dublin transfer; (4) the need to take into account the best interests of children.

The applicant, an ethnic Ingush and a Muslim from Ingushetia, Russia, feared her former husband and his family. She feared they would take her daughter away from her because she ran away with her child. Moreover, the applicant feared her eldest brother as he would marry her off to an elderly man and take her child away and hand the child over to her former husband.

The Refugee Appeals Board did not find that the conflicts between the applicant and her family members were of such nature and intensity to fall under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7. Consequently, the Board upheld the Danish Immigration Service’s decision to refuse the application.

The criminalisation of homosexuality and aggressions at the place of residence of the applicant constitute indications as to the existence of persecution. However, if it is only in the appearance, then internal flight is a possibility if the applicant stops his prostitution activities.