Case summaries
This case dealt with the issue that arose from the dissenting judgement of Judge Hogan in the case at the Court of Appeal – that is whether the Irish legislative provision preventing (without limitation) an asylum seeker from seeking, or entering, employment in the period before the final determination of his asylum claim was contrary to the right to work under the Irish Constitution and, if it was, to what extent could an asylum seeker claim the benefit of that right in the Constitution and to what extent could the State legitimately restrict that right.
The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.
It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Northern Central Administrative Court that denied the request to annul the order issued by the National Director of the Aliens and Borders Service.
The appeal was declared well-founded by the Supreme Administrative Court, considering the disregard of an essential formality that the law prescribes. Therefore, the decision determined the revocation of the judgment under appeal and the annulment of the contested act.
A waiver to file an appeal against custody prior to deportation is only possible under strict conditions. Particularly there has to be a qualified legal representation when signing the waiver.
The risk of absconding in the sense of Art. 76a Residence Act cannot be assumed because of the mere fact that another state is responsible for the asylum procedure of that person.
In contrast to the obligation to provide information to asylum applicants under the Dublin Regulation, Article 18(1) of the Eurodac Regulation has as its sole purpose and effect the effective protection of the personal data of the asylum seekers concerned. The right of asylum seekers to information contributes, together with the right of communication, the right to rectify and erase the data.
The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and a Sunni Muslim from Aleppo, Syria was granted temporary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (3).
A complaint to the Refugee Appeals Board was lodged claiming refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1), alternatively subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (2).
The applicants mother was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) due to her work in a health clinic treating injured insurgents.
The majority of the Board, referring to country of origin information, found that the applicant, as part of the mother’s household, if returned to Syria would be concretely and individually at risk of persecution.
The applicant thus fulfilled the conditions to be and was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).
This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.
The right to have recourse to the courts as enshrined in the German constitution (Art. 19 ss. 4 GG) is to be assessed in a thorough and reliable manner if the right to physical integrity (Art. 2 ss. 2 GG and Art. 3 of the ECHR) is at stake. The courts only adhere to this obligation if they carefully assess the evidence brought to them by the applicant considering the specific context of a person who has been granted international protection in a third country.
A grave psychological disease (post-traumatic stress disorder – PTSd) is a reason to grant interim legal protection against deportation, if the applicant is in a state of self-endangerment or potentially suicidal in case of a deportation.
The Federal Supreme Court rules that the separate detention of families with minor children and the placement in a children’s home violates the right to family life in Art. 8 ECHR, if less intrusive measures than detention have not been taken into consideration.