Case summaries

For the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention a person is “of” or “has” a nationality where it is established that  he or she is already of that nationality or he or she is not of that nationality but is entitled to it.  The person should not be considered to hold a nationality if he or she only “may” be able to acquire it.

In assessing nationality in claims for refugee status, nationality is a matter for the State in question’s law, constitution and (to a limited extent) practice which should be proved by evidence and decided on, as a matter of fact, by the court deciding the protection claim.  In considering whether a person is a national or is entitled to a nationality of a second State, the person must use their “best efforts” to clarify their status.  The evidence of the attitude of a State towards a person who is seeking not to be removed to that State may be of very limited relevance.

This case considered whether or not members of the Judiciary could be considered "a particular social group". It was found that they could not. The applicant did not convince the Court that on her return to Russia she would risk an unfair trial or unjust deprivation of liberty as a result of false allegations of bribery and knowingly handing down wrong decisions in court. The Court of Appeal considered that conditions in Russian prisons in general are not so severe as to warrant international protection.

The Iranian applicants’ asylum claim was rejected by the authorities as they were not found credible. As a result of this finding, the authorities did not consider their account in light of the country of origin information on Iran. The court quashed the decision and granted refugee status to the family reasoning that the authorities are obliged to carry out a thorough and complete fact assessment.

It was found that the contradictions in the applicants' account were not relevant from the point of view of international protection. The court also ruled that the authority is obliged to clarify misunderstandings at hearings, at the same time applicants have to be given the opportunity to justify contradictions and incoherencies in their statements.

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected. 

This Case concluded that membership of a terrorist organisation is not in itself a sufficient ground for exclusion from refugee status. 

Country of origin information can verify a situation in which the risk of persecution can exceptionally be considered to be proved without substantiating the personal circumstances of the applicant. The danger of the harm is real, and complies with the requirements of subsidiary protection.

This judgment overturned the decision of the Polish Refugee Board on revocation of refugee status. Adoption of state protection within the meaning of the law means that a foreigner benefits from the protection of the state of his nationality, that he is able to avail himself of this protection and that there exists no well-founded fear of persecution. Adoption of state protection means that the foreigner enjoys the genuine protection of his country of origin.

In proceedings on revocation of refugee status, the authority determines whether there are other reasons to justify the foreigner’s fear of persecution.

When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country. 

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

In this case the court considered the risk to a refugee of indirect refoulement from a third country.