Case summaries
The Court of Appeal considered a piece of legislation that required judges and decision-makers to “take into account, as damaging” to an asylum application’s credibility, certain specified behaviour, including the failure to claim asylum in a safe third country. The Court held that the relevant legislation must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with constitutional principles and which allowed the judiciary to make a global assessment of credibility in the individual case. If the legislation was interpreted as a direction it would risk distorting the fact-finding exercise conducted by the judiciary.
This case concerned the procedure for considering new evidence in subsequent asylum applications. The CALL found that the Immigration Department had not assessed whether a submitted document constituted a new element or not, but had instead decided that the document would not result in a determination of the existence of serious indications of a well-founded fear of persecution. In doing so, it was found that the Immigration Department had acted unlawfully (Art 51/8 of the Belgian Aliens Law).
This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.
The interview report established by an officer of a Prefecture is admissible evidence even if it has not been signed and was conducted without the assistance of an interpreter. When an asylum applicant denies having made statements recorded in that report, he must provide evidence. In this case, the applicant did not provide evidence that he had not crossed Italy and, in a written letter addressed to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, he even mentioned having crossed Italy.
New assessments and guidance from UNHCR regarding protection grounds and the possibility of internal protection are such "new circumstance" as referred to in Chapter 12 § 19 of the Aliens Act.
A recent UNHCR's report showing that the situation in Sri Lanka had significantly deteriorated for the group to which the applicant belonged was such a new factor and was likely to constitute a permanent obstacle to enforcement under Chapter 12. 1, 2 or 3 § and therefore a new assessment was granted.
The Secretary of State for Justice does not have to give an applicant who submitted copies of documents of which he had the possibility of acquiring the originals before he left his country, an opportunity to submit these originals during the asylum process, regardless of the State’s duty to conduct research and cooperate with the applicant as determined in Art 8 of the Procedures Directive and Art 4 of the Qualification Directive.
The seven day detention of a ‘temporarily admitted’ asylum seeker under the fast-track procedure was non-arbitrary and consistent with Article 5(1), but the 76 hour delay in providing the individual with the real reasons for his detention did not satisfy the promptness requirement of Article 5(2).
This case was an appeal against the decision of the Polish Refugee Board on refusal to accord refugee status on the grounds that the application was manifestly unfounded application, and on granting a permit for tolerated stay. The lack of grounds for an application does not mean that the case should not be examined on its merits.
When assessing a subsequent application, the authority may find that, in the framework of the new assertions of the interested party, the application is manifestly unfounded. The authority has the right to reach such a conclusion provided that the application is first examined in the context of its contents and in the context of the evidence cited by the Applicant.
The authority is also obliged to examine the case initiated by the subsequent application in light of the progress made, if any, in the case concerning the previously submitted (first) application for refugee status.
The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the decision issued by the High National Court refusing refugee status. The applicant challenged the decision on the grounds that the right to legal assistance, representation and to the assistance of an interpreter had been violated.
The Court held that the conditions for offering the Applicants temporary judicial protection had been satisfied, taking into consideration that the Asylum Committee had rejected the asylum-seeker's claims as being unsubstantiated without assessing his credibility, and also because the decision which rejected the application for asylum only vaguely referred to the prevailing situation in Iran.