Case summaries

The issue in this case was “complicity” – the Court analysed the facts of the applicant’s involvement in a violent paramilitary force in Iran to determine whether he was complicit in crimes against humanity, so as to be excluded from international protection. 

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

In applying Art 12 of the Qualification Directive concerning exclusion from refugee status, the decision-maker is required to conduct an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and, specifically, of his own complicity, if any, in crimes against humanity.

Passive complicity in genocide includes a material element and an intentional element, as active complicity does.

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected. 

The Tribunal considered whether a woman who had been involved in invasions of white-owned farms at the behest of the ruling party in Zimbabwe was excluded under Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Tribunal held, first of all, that Article 7(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is usually regarded as providing the best working definition of a crime against humanity for the purposes of Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Secondly, it held that where the act or crime does not involve the specifically listed forms of acts or crimes, in order to consider that a crime against humanity had occurred, the Tribunal must consider if the acts participated in by the appellant were of a “similar character” to those specified in Article 7(1)(a) to (j) of the Statute. In so doing, the Tribunal must consider the specific purpose of the crime, its intent and effect, the participation of an appellant in the crime and if needs be whether the appellant made a substantial contribution to the crime.

Membership of an organisation that was responsible for committing war crimes is not sufficient on its own to justify exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention or Article 12(2)(a) of the Qualification Directive.  Membership of the LTTE or its ‘Intelligence Division” was not enough, on its own, to justify the applicant’s exclusion.

Responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be considered with regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other international legal materials that have come into existence following the adoption of the Refugee Convention.

The decision maker should concentrate on the actual role played by the particular persons, taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the required degree of participation is established. The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of some of the relevant factors that should be considered.

Revocation of refugee status was lawful for a leading member of an organisation which has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (president of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - FDLR).

The CALL ruled that exclusion clauses are exceptional provisions with very serious consequences and should therefore be applied in a restrictive manner. There is a presumption of responsibility vis-à-vis persons holding high positions in a regime that is guilty of committing serious human rights violations, but such a presumption is refutable. It does not suffice to refer to the general situation in the country of origin at the time when the applicant held the position.