Case summaries
This was an application for an interim injunction preventing the removal of the applicants pending the outcome of their application for leave to apply for judicial review. The underlying leave application raised several different points, of these, one was deemed arguable: that Ireland’s deportation regime involving a lifetime ban on re-entry is contrary to the ECHR and Irish Constitution.
The applicant was not permitted to raise a new ground of claim based on her asserted homosexuality, when she had had numerous opportunities to raise this ground of claim earlier. The applicant was however granted leave to apply for judicial review, upon the Judge noting a factual error that had tainted the State’s earlier credibility assessment.
The applicant applied to the Minister to be readmitted to the asylum system many years after he had made a first application for refugee status which had been refused for non-attendance at a refugee interview. There was no new claim as such nor was there any new evidence to support the application. The Court found that the Minister was only required to decide whether what was adduced was ‘new’. The Minister’s obligation was not altered by the fact that the original application had not been fully processed but had been abandoned by the applicant and deemed withdrawn. An applicant is not entitled to exploit his own failure to prosecute his original application in order to compel the Minister to consent to what is, in effect a reopening of the original claim with no new evidence, argument elements or findings. The Court also found that Art 32 of the Procedures Directive did not assist the applicant and, in any event, there was no claim of ‘direct effect’ made on his behalf.
Conversion to Christianity led to a re-examination of impediments to enforcement.
During the refugee status proceedings, the administrative authorities should clarify on what grounds a foreign husband has received protection in another country. These circumstances should be assessed consistently in two countries.
There are no objective reasons why the respective positions of two individuals should be viewed differently merely because they have applied for refugee status in two different democratic countries that respect human rights.
The administrative authorities, when carrying out an assessment of whether a subsequent application for refugee status is inadmissible (based on the same grounds), should compare the factual basis for the administrative case on which a final decision has been made with the testimony of the foreignor provided in the subsequent application and should also examine whether the situation in the country of origin of the applicant and also the legal position have changed.
Legality of detention in the event of imminent deportation to Greece, if the detention was imposed before the judgment by the ECtHR in the case M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (application no. 30696/09) and there is an enforceable expulsion decision.
A subsequent application for asylum, when there is a legally enforceable expulsion order, must be examined even if a stay on expulsion has been requested by the European Court of Human Rights according to Rule 39.
Art 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act, just as Art 32 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, requires not only that the claimed facts and circumstances of the subsequent application are new, but also that they are relevant and thus contribute to the likelihood that the applicant qualifies for an asylum residence permit.