Case summaries
The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.
Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.
Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.
Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.
CD v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky establishes that the right to remain under the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32) completely immunises an applicant from being classified as an illegally staying third-country national under the Return Directive (2008/115). Consequently, a return decision cannot be issued at any point between the submission of an asylum application and the first-instance rejection of that application, even if the return decision concerns a period of illegal stay that occurred before the asylum application was made.
The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.
The Federal Administrative Court found that Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive does not hinder Member States to allow parents and siblings, fulfilling the requirements for family members under Art. 2(j) of the Directive, to change their status of subsidiary protection into a refugee status which they derive from their minor sponsor.
The Court of Justice held that Directive 2011/95 does not preclude a Member State from granting refugee status to a minor through one of his parents, even though there is no risk of persecution in case of removal to his country of nationality (Tunisia).
The Court decides that the relevant point in time to assess the ‘minor’ status of a beneficiary of international protection under the Qualification Directive is the date on which the applicant makes an (informal) application for international protection.
The Court decides that the notion of ‘family member’ under the Qualification Directive does not require an actual resumption of family life between the parent who benefited international protection and the child. Furthermore, the rights of a family member to claim the benefits under the Qualification Directive persist after the beneficiary of subsidiary protection reaches the age of majority, for the duration of the period of validity of the residence permit granted to them.
The Court finds that third-country nationals without a valid residence title in a Member State are illegally present in that Member State and thus fall under the scope of the Return Directive, irrespective of the situation or the measures that led to the illegal presence of the person concerned. Against this backdrop, the Court holds that a deportation order cannot uphold an entry and residence ban without there being any return decision for the applicant which is thus incompatible with the Return Directive.
National legislation that grants the possibility of rejecting an application made by a third-country national or a stateless person for international protection, whose previous application seeking refugee status in another Member State implementing the Dublin III Regulation had been rejected, is precluded under Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32 read in conjunction with Article 2(q) thereof.
Article 27(1) of Dublin III Regulation read in the light of recital 19 thereof, and Article 47 of the Charter preclude national legislation that bars domestic courts from assessing an application for annulment of a Dublin transfer decision by considering circumstances that emerged after the transfer decision was adopted and which are decisive for the correct application of the regulation. However, such circumstances may not be considered if that legislation foresees a specific remedy with ex nunc review that can be exercised after the emergence of the new circumstances is not conditional on the person’s deprivation of liberty or on the imminent implementation of that decision.
The case concerned the conformity of integration requirements for residence permit applicants in Dutch law with Article 15 of Directive 2003/86, regarding autonomous residence permits. The CJEU held that it cannot be excluded that such a residence permit may be dependent on the successful completion of a civic integration examination on the language and society of that Member State. However, the connection of residence permits with integration frameworks cannot go beyond what is necessary for the objective of facilitating integration of third-country nationals.