Case summaries

The Appellant applied for asylum in Sweden on the basis of being a refugee as per his registration at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Alternatively the appellant argued that his need for protection should be judged against his previous residency in in Syria. The main issue faced by the court was whether the appellant’s normal place of residence should be considered as Syria or Algeria, and thus against which of these two countries the appellant’s need for protection should be judged.

The Court deemed Algeria to be the appellant’s normal place of residence based on his formal and non-formal ties to the country as well as his 18 months stay in the Algeria prior to coming to Sweden. Based on this the court did not deem the appellant to have the required need for protection and denied his appeal.

For the assumption of reasonable internal flight alternatives, a case-by-case assessment must be made on the basis of sufficient findings about the expected situation of the asylum applicant in the country of origin. On the basis of general information on the situation in the country of origin, a young, healthy man with school education and professional experience and who is familiar with the local conditions, can in principle be expected to resettle in Kabul.

The Regional Administrative Court of Upper Austria requests a preliminary ruling of the CJEU concerning the interpretation of Article 29 Directive 2011/95/EU in the context of social assistance for persons entitled to asylum with a temporary residence permit.

1) Must Article 29 Directive 2011/95/EU, entitling persons subject to international protection to the same level of social assistance in the Member State as nationals of this Member State, be interpreted as fulfilling the conditions for direct effect as set out in the CJEU’s jurisprudence?

2) Must Article 29 Directive 2011/95/EU be interpreted in the way, that it opposes national legislation that provides for persons with a temporary residence permit the same level of social assistance as for persons falling under subsidiary protection, while persons with a permanent residence permit are allowed to the social assistance provided for nationals of the Member State concerned?

The applicants appealed the decision to deny family reunification and family extension in relation to the refugee status of their daughter. The Administration denied this claim based on the fact that the applicants have a different nationality than their daughter, which would contravene the requirement established in article 40.a) of Law 12/2009. Article 41 of said Act, however, addresses this specific situation; However, the requirement of developing this provision by regulation had not been complied by Spain. The Court assesses whether this article should be applicable in the current case, despite not presenting the requirement of regulation, and concludes that the similarity of the wording of articles 40 and 41 is enough as to deem the latter applicable.

When examining the acceptance of an asylum claim, the authorities have to study whether the testimony of the applicant is based on presumably true facts. Only if it is manifestly false could the admission of this application be denied.

The principle of family unity has to be taken into account regarding the assessment of the circumstances of the applicant, especially since his sister’s application for international protection was accepted.

The court gave guidance on the application of a structured approach to credibility assessment.

In countries where there is a high prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), as in Nigeria, non-excised persons can be considered as having a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of 1951 Refugee Convention. Refugee status can be granted where there is a considerable risk of excision and insufficient protection against this threat.

The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.

The case concerns the validity of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the Receptions Conditions Directive in the light of Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.