Case summaries

The Federal Administrative Court changed its jurisprudence concerning those competence provisions of the Dublin-III-Regulation that can be challenged with a complaint against a decision not to take charge. The Court follows the approach taken by the CJEU in Ghezelbash (C-63/15) and Mengesteab (C-670/16) and allows complaints based on missing the term to request another Member State to take charge (Article 21(1) Dublin-III-Regulation). If successful, the Member State responsible for requesting to take charge will, itself, be in charge to deal with the asylum application.

The Court also held that notifications by the Swiss Ministry for Migration (SEM) stating that the Dublin-procedure has been terminated are considered to be interim acts that can be reviewed until the closing of the complete procedure, if the acting authority provides objective grounds and acts in respect of the principle of good faith.

The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary ruling:

(i) when dealing with transfer of a protection applicant under regulation 604/2013 to the UK, is a national decision-maker, in considering any issues arising in relation to the discretion under art. 17 and/or any issues of protection of fundamental rights in the UK, required to disregard circumstances as they stand at the time of such consideration in relation to the proposed withdrawal of the UK from the EU;

(ii) does the concept of the “determining member state” in regulation 614/2013 include the role of the member state in exercising the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iii) do the functions of a member state under art. 6 of regulation 604/2013 include the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iv) does the concept of an effective remedy apply to a first instance decision under art. 17 of regulation 604/2013 such that an appeal or equivalent remedy must be made available against such a decision and/or such that national legislation providing for an appellate procedure against a first instance decision under the regulation should be construed as encompassing an appeal from a decision under art. 17;

(v) does art. 20(3) of regulation 604/2013 have the effect that in the absence of any evidence to displace a presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to treat his or her situation as indissociable from that of the parents, the national decision maker is not required to consider such best interests separately from the parents as a discrete issue or as a starting point for consideration of whether the transfer should be take place.

The case concerns the calculation of time limits for detention for the purpose of a Dublin transfer under Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation (DRIII).

Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for international protection may rely, in the context of an action brought against a decision to transfer him, on the expiry of a period laid down in Article 21(1) of that regulation, even if the requested Member State is willing to take charge of that applicant.

The two-month period for submitting a take charge request where there has been a Eurodac hit is not cumulative with the general three-month period for take charge requests.

An application for international protection is deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared by a public authority and certifying that a third-country national has requested international protection, has reached the authority responsible for implementing the obligations arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the main information contained in such a document, but not that document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority.

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

The following question is referred to the CJEU under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure:

Does Article 26 of the Dublin Regulation III prevent the competent authorities in a Member State, who have requested another Member State to take responsibility under a take back or take charge request of an applicant who has applied for international protection (which has not yet been ruled definitely upon) or any other person caught by Article 18(1)(c) or (d), from taking a transfer decision and notifying the applicant before the requested State has accepted the take back or take charge request?

Art 20 (3) of the Dublin III Regulation is no longer applicable when a minor subsequently enters another member state after the application for international protection of his/ her relative is completed.

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

The Upper Tribunal ordered the Secretary of State for the Home Department to immediately admit four vulnerable Syrians from an unofficial migrant camp in France to the United Kingdom in order to be reunited with refugee family members during the examination their asylum applications. Although they had not applied for asylum in France or been subject to Dublin procedures, the particular circumstances meant that failing to do so would lead to a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for family life.