Case summaries

The Office of Immigration and Nationality issued a decision on the responsibility of the Republic of Bulgaria under the Dublin III Regulation, without having informed the Applicant about the applicability of the Regulation in his case. The Court quashed the decision and declared the Applicant’s right to be heard was not respected.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.

The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) submitted the following two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling according to Article 267 TFEU:

The appeal procedure dealt with the question of whether the complainant is to be classified as a minor according to Article 2 lit. g of the Dublin III Regulation, with the consequence that Article 8 para. 1 of the Dublin III Regulation is applicable and the complainant can therefore remain with her sister in Switzerland. In particular the term “legally present” and the procedure of taking evidence were discussed in depth.

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

The question remains open and needs to be clarified in legal proceedings, whether there are systemic flaws in the Bulgarian asylum procedure and conditions of admission, such as pose a risk of infringement of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (cf. Article 3(2) Regulation No. 604/2013(Dublin III)) – in particular in the case of a return under the Dublin system.

While accepting that Hungary is the responsible EU State for processing the applicant's asylum application (Article 18(1) Dublin Regulation III), the Court held that  a transfer to Hungary may not occur due to systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary,  that would  put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 3 para 2 Dublin III) .

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary).