Case summaries

The political, humanitarian and economic crisis in Venezuela can justify subsidiary protection status if the individual’s return to the country of origin, would cause serious harm, characterized by the level of seriousness required to be considered as inhuman and degrading treatment.

A Member State is not required to issue a decision on its own responsibility under Dublin III when, in its capacity as the determining Member State, it found that there is no sufficient evidence to establish responsibility of another Member State. Domestic courts do not have to examine the application of the Dublin criteria ex proprio motu in the context of a review of the rejection of an application for international protection.

Religion is a broad concept that encompasses both internal elements of faith and an external component of manifestation. The applicant does not have to provide documentation and make statements on both elements but has to cooperate with the authorities and substantiate the reasons that his claim of persecution on the grounds of religion is true. The provision of the death penalty in national legislation could constitute an “act of persecution” on its own, provided that the penalty is actually enforced and regardless of whether the measure is considered important for reasons of public order in that country of origin.

1. Afghans who have worked for international aid organisations are particularly endangered of becoming victims of political persecution by non-state actors (e.g. Taliban) according to § 3 (1) AsylG in case of a return to Afghanistan.

2. There is no internal protection for these people. They cannot escape the clutches of non-state actors as these groups have a wide (information) network at their disposal and an increased interest in persons who have worked for international aid organisations.

When deciding whether refugee status should be available , one must not only consider any pre-persecution but also post-flight circumstances. Judged  on a forward looking basis of persecution of political enemies within Syrian territory, upon return to Syria there continues to be a danger of individual persecution including human rights violations by reason of belonging to a certain group. 

The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran.  However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR. 

The applicant challenged the Belgian Minister of Asylum and Migration’s decision not to grant him a humanitarian visa via an emergency application before the CALL. He relied on the following grounds: inter alia, (i) his medical condition and (ii) the poor living conditions of the West Bank in Palestine.

The CALL decided (i) these two elements justified an urgent decision, (ii) there was a risk of serious prejudice which would be difficult to remedy if the Minister’s decision was enforced, and (iii) there were serious grounds for invalidating the Minister’s decision since denying a visa to the applicant was likely to constitute a breach of art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), thus fulfilling the three conditions under art. 39/82 of the Belgian Aliens Law 15-12-1980. 

The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal  (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.

The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.  

The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.  

Interventions from third parties to proceedings initiated before the National Asylum Court may be admitted.

A person with refugee status in one European Union state who applies for refugee status in a second European Union state is presumed to have unfounded fears relating to lack of protection. However, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.