Case summaries

The ECtHR ruled that the Greek authorities had failed in their positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR to guarantee that the applicant’s asylum request is examined within a reasonable time in order to ensure that his situation of insecurity, which impinges upon several elements of his private life, is as short-lived as possible. 

A general circular letter send by Italian authorities is not a sufficient individual guarantee regarding a Dublin Transfer of a man suffering from various serious diseases.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

Regarding the protection of the right to family life in asylum procedures, same-sex partnerships are in a comparable situation with heterosexual relationships. A distinction between the applicants for international protection based on sexual orientation is not in compliance with the Constitution. Article 16b(1) of IPA, which does not consider persons of a same-sex living in established partnership as family members, is inconsistent with the right to non-discriminatory treatment in the exercise of the right to family life.

The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were applying for leave to remain in Sweden due to affiliation with their husband and father respectively who had permanent residency in Sweden. The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were all granted evidentiary relief regarding their identities. Further, one of the Applicant’s children, a 20 year old daughter, was deemed to fulfil the criteria for household community and special dependency. The Applicant and all of the Applicant’s children were granted leave to remain. 

Art 20 (3) of the Dublin III Regulation is no longer applicable when a minor subsequently enters another member state after the application for international protection of his/ her relative is completed.

The absence of an individual right of the applicant to challenge the determination of the State responsible to examine their asylum claim on Dublin II grounds does not prohibit the autonomous application of ECHR Article 8 to decisions to remove persons from one Member State to another. However, taking into account the significance of the Regulation and the need to preserve its effectiveness, an especially compelling case would have to be demonstrated to deny removal following a Dublin II decision. When the Secretary of State has certified such human rights claims as clearly unfounded, it must be shown that the same decision could have been reached on reasonable grounds by an immigration judge.

The concept of family life under Article 8 ECHR and under the Portuguese Constitution requires the existence of an effective connection between the individuals, which also presupposes the existence of a financial interdependency.

The applicants are Afghan nationals married religiously in Iran when the first applicant was 14 years old and the second applicant 18 years old. When they applied for asylum in Switzerland a year later, the Swiss authorities did not consider them as being married and the second applicant was subsequently expelled to Italy. They alleged that this expulsion constituted a violation of their Article 8 ECHR right to respect for family life. The Court found that the Swiss government had been justified in finding that they were not married, and held that the decision to expel the second applicant was not a violation of Article 8.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17).