Case summaries

The case concerns a recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom, who was to be deported in the interests of national security to Jordan. The UK Government obtained assurances from Jordan that he would not be subjected to ill-treatment and would be tried fairly by the Jordanian State Security Court. However the applicant alleged that, if deported to Jordan, he would be at real risk of ill-treatment and an unfair trial.

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order.

This case concerned special protection status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention andexclusion from protection of those who have committed a serious crime under “common law”. The crime committed by the applicant (attempted murder of the Indian Ambassador in Romania) does not fall within the concepts of “political”, “composite” or “related” crimes, even if it was carried out because of the offender's political opinions or principles, or with the intent of achieving such aims. The implementation of the exclusion clause is not precluded because of the fact that the party has already served the sentence which was imposed. The judgment regarding the applicant having committed a serious criminal offence was justified. The decision was opposed by a minority. Consideration was given to the severity of the persecution the applicant risked suffering should he return to India and non-refoulement was approved, his deportation was given suspensive effect, and he was given temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.

The detention of asylum applicants may undermine their ability to claim asylum and that an ‘effective remedy’ requires an appeal with suspensive effect against refoulement in order to prevent irreparable harm, sufficient time to prepare the appeal and effective legal assistance and interpretation.

The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.

The High Court held that in a case where a negative recommendation in a first instance application for asylum was based exclusively or primarily upon a finding of a personal lack of credibility, there is an obligation to allow an oral appeal in order to provide an "effective remedy," in the sense of Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, notwithstanding that the Applicant is from a “safe country” and the legislation allows for limiting an Applicant to a written appeal only in those circumstances. For the same reasons, to allow an oral appeal is also required by the right to fair procedures contained in Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.

It is the duty of the administrative authority to establish all of the facts that are important in a procedure, and thus to complete the background information for a decision to the extent that it forms a reliable basis for the decision-making itself.

The administrative authority is not relieved of this duty even with regard to the provisions of Section 34(3) of Act No 71/1967 Coll. on administrative procedure (hereinafter the “Administrative Procedure Code“), according to which the participants in a procedure must put forward the evidence that is known to them in support of their claims. 

The Constitutional Court presents its opinion on the nature of the rights and principles contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU) and on jurisdiction for the decision on questions of interpretation in connection with the CFRU. It gave an answer in the affirmative to the question of whether the CFRU, in particular Article 47 CFRU, is applicable in asylum proceedings if no such violation was found in the actual case at hand.

A Russian Federation citizen arrived in Finland from another EU country (Lithuania) where he/she alleged that he/she had been persecuted and claimed international protection on this basis. The Immigration Service denied the Applicant a residence permit, failed to examine the application for international protection and decided to deport him/her to Lithuania. The Immigration Service considered Lithuania to be a safe third country and the application for international protection was not examined in relation to his/her country of origin.  The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the issue of international protection could not be dealt with in Lithuania as the grounds for the application were cited as persecution in that same country.  The Administrative Court was ordered  to overturn the Immigration Service’s decision and return the case back for further consideration.

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability.