Case summaries

Conclusions on exclusion from protection are to be supported by factual findings and cannot be presumed, especially with an applicant, who through the credibility assessment, is deemed to be untrustworthy by an administrative body. Belonging to the army under Saddam Hussein might, together with the Sunni religion of the applicant, be understood as a reason for well-founded fear of persecution because of membership of a particular social group.

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

B.G., a citizen of the Russian Federation, applied for refugee status, citing persecution experienced due to his brother being in prison. The authorities of both instances questioned his credibility, citing numerous inconsistencies in the various testimonies given. The foreignor then appealed to the Regional Administrative Court, which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the proceedings had been conducted properly and referring to the fact that the foreignor was able to flee internally in his country of origin.

The authority conducting the proceedings provides, where necessary, translations into Polish of documents in a foreign language that are admissible as evidence in refugee status proceedings.

The option of internal flight means that if there is a part of the country of origin where there are no circumstances justifying the foreignor's fear of persecution or serious harm and it can reasonably be presumed that the foreignor will be able to move there without impediment, there is no well-founded fear of persecution or actual risk of serious harm in the country of origin. If the conditions in one region do not suit the foreignor, he can try to move to another part of the country.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

Despite his family ties, the Applicant was denied an extension to his residence document as he was regarded as a threat to public order and security.

The question was what emphasis had to be placed on the Union membership of the Applicant’s spouse and child of whom they had joint custody.

The expulsion of an asylum seeker after asylum proceedings lasting approximately eight years without any culpable delay by the Applicant, during which he established a family and also integrated well in other respects, infringes his right to a private and family life.

The application by the Applicant for the assignment of a legal adviser for the appeal proceedings was rejected by the Asylum Court because it was late, as the Applicant had only submitted the application after the expiry of the one-month transition period. The Constitutional Court annulled the corresponding transitional regulation on grounds of unconstitutionality: a deadline of only one month was too short to deal with the lack of understanding of asylum seekers of the language and law.

An exclusion order was issued to the Applicant and therefore a measure within the meaning of the Returns Directive. Without undertaking an oral hearing, the appeals authority confirmed the issue of the exclusion order, but reduced its duration. In accordance with Art 47 Para. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the appeals authority was however obliged to undertake an oral hearing.