Case summaries

The fact that the membership of a particular social group is not subject to specific repressive criminal provisions has no incidence on the granting of refugee status.

An application to suspend the effects of a decision, contained in an appeal of a decision ordering return and a ban from re-entering the territory of Poland and other Schengen area states should be allowed, due to the validity of the Applicant remaining in Poland pending the conclusion of the administrative court proceedings. Under art. 61 § 3 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, the Court may, upon the application of the Appellant, order that the challenged decision be suspended, in whole or in part, if the act or function to be performed would result in a risk of significant harm or other consequences which are difficult to reverse.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

The Syrian family's application for a Humanitarian Visa at the Belgian embassy in Lebanon fell outside the scope of the Visa Code, even if formally submitted on the basis of its Article 25(1)(a), because the purpose of the application (that is, to apply for asylum upon arrival to Belgium) differs from that of a short-term visa. 

The application of S.C. and her minor children Z.C. and F.C. related to the cassation of an Appeal Court judgement regarding compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of an indisputably unjust decision to place the Applicants in a Guarded Detention Centre for Foreigners. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged judgement and passed the case to the Appeal Court for re-consideration. 

Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.

If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.

It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.

Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.

An application, by way of judicial review, for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the second named defendant (that being the International Protection Appeals Tribunal) on the basis of the application of the incorrect standard of proof being applied, credibility assessment and disregard of notice of appeal and country of origin information. 

After having committed several offences qualified as being of a ‘particular gravity’, Mr.O’s refugee status was revoked on April 21st 2006.

Upon appeal to the Council of Alien Law Litigation (‘CALL’), the question of the validity of article 55/3/1 of December 15th 1980 law (the ‘1980 Law’) arose. Although it is established that this provision is transposing article 14(4) of the Directive 2011/95/EU, its compatibility with the Geneva Convention must be verified.

The Council refuses then to pronounce itself on the question, arguing the competency of such matter is vested in the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Granting someone a refugee status for fear of persecution based on belonging to a social group due to his sexual orientation, cannot be linked to the fact that his sexual orientation has, or not, been made public. Indeed, a social group is instituted by how society perceive those in the group.

An individual applying for asylum does not have, in order to avoid persecutions in his country, to hide his sexual orientation.

In order to prove the risk of persecution, there is no requirement that belonging to a social group based on sexual orientation must be prohibited by any criminal law in the country of origin of the applicant. In fact, this risk can be based on abusive common law provisions, or behaviours, whether they are supported, facilitated or merely tolerated by the country’s authorities.

Where the ECtHR has, under Article 39 of the ECHR, granted interim measures prohibiting the Government from deporting the Applicant, this does not impact the ability of national courts to rule on the Applicant’s claim to asylum. The interim measures are binding on national authorities only.