Case summaries
The Immigration and Asylum Office unlawfully rejected the claimant’s application for international protection. The court found that the authorities did not objectively assess the evidence and country information provided by the claimant, a Coptic Christian from Egypt. They also failed to correctly interpret the definition of a refugee in accordance with international law and disregarded the special status of the claimant who was an underage applicant.
Effective access to justice relies on an individual having a voice in the proceedings concerning him or her. Solely focusing on the credibility of the appellant’s account and not having regard to objective evidence testifying to the appellant’s vulnerability or the risk to the appellant of return to Afghanistan has led to the proceedings being neither fair nor just. A material error of law has therefore been committed.
The Tribunal reasserted the decision maker’s duty of confidentiality in considering documents produced in support of a protection claim. Where there is a needed to make an inquiry in the country of origin then written consent must be given by the applicant. Moreover, Article 22 of the Asylum Procedures Directive prohibits direct contact with the alleged actor of persecution. Additionally, the Refugee Convention requires that the authentication of a document is undertaken with a precautionary approach, namely whether an inquiry is necessary or should be framed in a specific manner and whether there is a safer alternative. Ultimately, disclosure of personal information should go no further than is strictly necessary.
The Tribunal found that the respondent was unlikely to have breached confidentiality in her inquiries into the authenticity of the documents produced; and that if she had, the remedy would not be the grant of refugee status; and that the appellant had not established that he had a credible case for asylum on the basis of the documents submitted. Nonetheless the Tribunal highlighted that a failure to comply with the duty of confidentiality might be relevant to the overall assessment of risk on return.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Section 5(3) Nr. 4 NÖ MSG, which excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from benefiting from social assistance out of the means-tested minimum income scheme when the person already receives social assistance covered by NÖ GVG is compatible with constitutional rights. It held that it does not constitute a violation of the principle of non-discrimination amongst foreigners. Given the provisional character of residence rights for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection such a legal rule falls within the wide margin of appreciation of the legislator.
Following the appeal of the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the order of the Regional Administrative Court, in relation to a challenge to the decision of the Polish Refugee Board, and set aside the aforementioned decision to refuse tolerated stay, dismissing the appeal in all other respects.
The court justified its decision with reference to the procedural errors of the Polish Refugee Board, which included failing to gather evidence in an appropriate manner and inappropriately establishing the facts relating to the Applicant’s children.
The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR.
An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.
This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.