UK - AS (Iran) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, 12 October 2017
| Country of Decision: | United Kingdom |
| Country of applicant: | Iran |
| Court name: | Royal Courts of Justice (Lady Justice Rafferty, Lord Justice Irwin and Lord Justice Moylan) |
| Date of decision: | 12-10-2017 |
| Citation: | AS (Iran) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1539 |
Keywords:
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Country of origin information
Description
"Information used by the Member States authorities to analyse the socio-political situation in countries of origin of applicants for international protection (and, where necessary, in countries through which they have transited) in the assessment, carried out on an individual basis, of an application for international protection.” It includes all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, obtained from various sources, including the laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied, regulations of the country of origin, plus general public sources, such as reports from (inter)national organisations, governmental and non-governmental organisations, media, bi-lateral contacts in countries of origin, embassy reports, etc. This information is also used inter alia for taking decisions on other migration issues, e.g. on return, as well as by researchers. One of the stated aims of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is to progressively bring all activities related to practical cooperation on asylum under its roof, to include the collection of Country of Origin Information and a common approach to its use. |
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Credibility assessment
Description
Assessment made in adjudicating an application for a visa, or other immigration status, in order to determine whether the information presented by the applicant is consistent and credible. |
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Well-founded fear
Description
One of the central elements of the refugee definition under Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention is a “well-founded fear of persecution”: "Since fear is subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in the person applying for recognition as a refugee. Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judgement on the situation prevailing in his country of origin. To the element of fear--a state of mind and a subjective condition--is added the qualification ‘well-founded’. This implies that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by an objective situation. The term ‘well-founded fear’ therefore contains a subjective and an objective element, and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must be taken into consideration." |
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Religion
Description
One of the grounds of persecution specified in the refugee definition under Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention. According to the Qualification Directive, the concept of religion includes in particular the holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief. |
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Membership of a particular social group
Description
One of the grounds of persecution specified in the refugee definition per Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention. According to the Qualification Directive, membership of a particular social group means members who share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. Depending on the circumstances in the country of origin, a particular social group might include a group based on a common characteristic of sexual orientation. Sexual orientation cannot be understood to include acts considered to be criminal in accordance with national law of the Member States: Gender related aspects might be considered, without by themselves alone creating a presumption for the applicability of this concept. |
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Political Opinion
Description
One of the grounds of persecution specified in the refugee definition per Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention. According to the Qualification Directive the concept of political opinion includes holding an opinion, thought or belief on a matter related to potential actors of persecution and to their policies or methods, whether or not that opinion, thought or belief has been acted upon by the applicant. |
Headnote:
The appellant claimed that the Tribunals in their determinations had failed to give adequate reasons for their conclusions, in particular that the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear. The Court considered the grounds for this claim and found that since we should ‘avoid a requirement of perfection’ (para 26) they were not sufficient to establish that the tribunals had erred, nor that the claimant was at risk of persecution.
Facts:
The claimant lived in the UK from 2001 to 2009 on a visit visa. She converted to Christianity in 2002 and applied for asylum unsuccessfully; she was removed to Iran in 2009. She claimed to have left Iran illegally in September 2012, arriving in the UK. This case was an appeal from earlier decisions of the FTT and UT which refused her claims for asylum and humanitarian protection: first, because as a victim of domestic violence she is a member of a particular social group; second, because she may face persecution as a Christian convert if removed to Iran.
Decision & reasoning:
There were three grounds of appeal (paras 12-14). The first was that the FtT had failed to give adequate reasons for considering the appellant (as a victim of domestic violence in Iran) as a member of a ‘particular social group with a well-founded fear of persecution.’ The Court found that, while (as the Secretary of State accepted) women in Iran do form a particular social group, the claimant could not argue a well-founded fear of persecution on that basis (par 28) being well-educated with no dependent child.
The second was that the FtT failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusion that she did not demonstrate a well-founded fear on the basis of religion. She claimed (para 37) that her history as a convert is an intrinsic part of her religious identity. In response, the Court noted that the applicant had not evangelised or proselytised and, indeed, saw her religion as a personal matter. The Court found that there are a number of Christians living in Iran and that if they do not proselytise they are not subject to persecution. Thus, the applicant did not fall within the category specified in HJ (Iran) of persons concealing their religion in order to avoid persecution. Ultimately, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that her conversion is her personal history and part of her religious belief or identity. Whilst this may be different if, as part of her religion, active evangelising was a duty, this was not the case for the applicant. Ultimately the Court agreed with the respondent that ‘the route by which an individual acquires religious belief, by upbringing or conversion, does not form part of identity, or (at least necessarily) religion’ (par 40). The Court, therefore, rejected this ground.
The third ground was that the FtT did not give adequate reasons for concluding that ‘the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of her illegal exit from Iran’ despite a recent report from Amnesty International (par 30). Essentially, as the Court said (para 33) this was ‘a challenge to the factual findings in the First-tier Tribunal’. The Court considered the claim and found that while the Appellant could be held for a few days and questioned on arrival (par 30), as was clear from the Respondent’s Country Information, she had actually no real political profile in Iran (par 32), although she had tried to boost it by sur place activities. She did not have a well-founded fear.
Consequently, the Court found that in none of these cases had there been a material error, pointing out that ‘in approaching criticism of reasons given by a First-tier Tribunal, the Respondent correctly reminds us to avoid a requirement of perfection.’ (par 26).
Outcome:
Application denied.
Observations/comments:
Cases involving Christian converts in Iran constantly recur in the courts, the definitive guidance being that of Ouseley J in FS (UKIAT 303, 2004), several times reaffirmed. Here the appellant claimed additional grounds - the (substantial) risk of domestic violence from her husband \and the fact that she had left illegally.
The case is discussed further in the Free Movement blog, Court of Appeal: private religious belief does not risk persecution.
This case summary was written by Luke Hodgkin, LLM graduate, Birkbeck University.
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited National Legislation:
| Cited National Legislation |
| UK - Refugee or Persons in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 |
Cited Cases:
Other sources:
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) - Article 18