Case summaries

An internal armed conflict, characterised by armed clashes, prevails throughout the whole territory of Afghanistan. The situation in the Kabul region and the city itself constitutes indiscriminate violence resulting from this internal armed conflict.

Transferring a family to Finland under the Dublin Regulation where their asylum application and subsequent appeals have been rejected is unlawful on account of the humanitarian and security situation in Afghanistan. 

The refusal of an entry decision given to an unaccompanied child at the Franco-Italian border is manifestly unlawful and constitutes a severe breach of the applicant’s interest.

The Appellant applied for asylum in Sweden on the basis of being a refugee as per his registration at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Alternatively the appellant argued that his need for protection should be judged against his previous residency in in Syria. The main issue faced by the court was whether the appellant’s normal place of residence should be considered as Syria or Algeria, and thus against which of these two countries the appellant’s need for protection should be judged.

The Court deemed Algeria to be the appellant’s normal place of residence based on his formal and non-formal ties to the country as well as his 18 months stay in the Algeria prior to coming to Sweden. Based on this the court did not deem the appellant to have the required need for protection and denied his appeal.

For the assumption of reasonable internal flight alternatives, a case-by-case assessment must be made on the basis of sufficient findings about the expected situation of the asylum applicant in the country of origin. On the basis of general information on the situation in the country of origin, a young, healthy man with school education and professional experience and who is familiar with the local conditions, can in principle be expected to resettle in Kabul.

The applicant, a national from Sierra Leone who claimed asylum in Switzerland on the grounds of persecution owing to his homosexuality, is found not to be at risk of treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention in case of return to his country of origin. In substance, the Court recalls that national authorities are in the best position to carry out this risk assessment and recalls the UNHCR Guiding Principles on asylum claims based on sexual orientation, which require the evaluation of the risk through individual assessment, in addition to the examination of the country’s general situation. 

When examining the acceptance of an asylum claim, the authorities have to study whether the testimony of the applicant is based on presumably true facts. Only if it is manifestly false could the admission of this application be denied.

The principle of family unity has to be taken into account regarding the assessment of the circumstances of the applicant, especially since his sister’s application for international protection was accepted.

The Court held that where asylum applicants are prevented from obtaining necessary documentation that would allow them to be granted a license to marry, due to their severed ties with their countries of origin, a simple statutory declaration will suffice as proof that there are no legal obstacles preventing them from getting married.   

In countries where there is a high prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), as in Nigeria, non-excised persons can be considered as having a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of 1951 Refugee Convention. Refugee status can be granted where there is a considerable risk of excision and insufficient protection against this threat.

The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.

The appellant claimed that the Tribunals in their determinations had failed to give adequate reasons for their conclusions, in particular that the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear. The Court considered the grounds for this claim and found that since we should ‘avoid a requirement of perfection’ (para 26) they were not sufficient to establish that the tribunals had erred, nor that the claimant was at risk of persecution.