Case summaries
Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered.
The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.
A claim based on past persecution was rejected on the basis that it lacked credibility. A challenge to the decision of the Tribunal was successful on the basis that the decision did not contain any reasoned assessment of the prospective risk of future persecution if returned to Sudan. The High Court in its judgment cautioned against the use of case law as a source of country of origin information.
This case considered exclusion from refugee status and found that criminal proceedings are not required for the application of Art 12.2 of the Qualification Directive or Art 1F of the Refugee Convention.
For the exclusion ground of war crimes or crimes against humanity to be applicable it is not necessary to establish to the point of utmost certainty that a refugee has committed such crimes, it is sufficient if serious reasons justify this assumption. A revocation of refugee status is also possible if war crimes or crimes against humanity have been committed after refugee status was granted.
The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.
A foreigner who wishes to be placed under the special protection of refugee status must show the Administration, with reasonable clarity and in an objectively reasoned way, that there are specific facts which cause him to have a fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion. If such substantive claims have not been submitted, but only general, vague or manifestly unfounded claims; or if specific facts have indeed been cited but these do not establish grounds for refugee status, then there is no obligation to give specific reasons for rejecting the application for asylum. The “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status” issued by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is non-binding in nature but contains “best practice” for the relevant authorities when examining asylum applications and, in that way, sets out “soft law”. Granting a residence permit on humanitarian grounds falls within the broad discretionary powers of the relevant authority; but it can, exceptionally, be obligatory if the foreigner would – should he be repatriated to the country of origin – be at risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Rights violations resulting from a forced marriage, including the use of physical and mental violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights in terms of Art 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
The Iranian state is neither able nor willing to protect women against persecution by relatives in case of forced marriage.
For the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention a person is “of” or “has” a nationality where it is established that he or she is already of that nationality or he or she is not of that nationality but is entitled to it. The person should not be considered to hold a nationality if he or she only “may” be able to acquire it.
In assessing nationality in claims for refugee status, nationality is a matter for the State in question’s law, constitution and (to a limited extent) practice which should be proved by evidence and decided on, as a matter of fact, by the court deciding the protection claim. In considering whether a person is a national or is entitled to a nationality of a second State, the person must use their “best efforts” to clarify their status. The evidence of the attitude of a State towards a person who is seeking not to be removed to that State may be of very limited relevance.