Case summaries

When State Parties do not examine an application for international protection in its mertis based on a safe third country clause, Article 3 still requires that they apply a thorough and comprehensive legal procedure to assess the existence of such risk by looking into updated sources regarding the situation in the receiving third country. Hungary violated Article 3 by failing to conduct an efficient and adequate assessment when applying the safe third country clause for Serbia.

Article 5 cannot be considered as ratione materiae applicable to the Röszke transit zone; the applicants' stay there involved a short waiting time in order for Hungary to verify their right to enter, they had entered on their own initiative and they were free to leave the area in the direction of Serbia. The conditions in the transit zone were not found to breach Article 3 because of the restrictive measure's short duration, the possibility for human contact and the applicants' awareness of the procedure.

A Member State is not required to issue a decision on its own responsibility under Dublin III when, in its capacity as the determining Member State, it found that there is no sufficient evidence to establish responsibility of another Member State. Domestic courts do not have to examine the application of the Dublin criteria ex proprio motu in the context of a review of the rejection of an application for international protection.

Religion is a broad concept that encompasses both internal elements of faith and an external component of manifestation. The applicant does not have to provide documentation and make statements on both elements but has to cooperate with the authorities and substantiate the reasons that his claim of persecution on the grounds of religion is true. The provision of the death penalty in national legislation could constitute an “act of persecution” on its own, provided that the penalty is actually enforced and regardless of whether the measure is considered important for reasons of public order in that country of origin.

A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.

Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations. 

The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.

An asylum applicant who is below the age of 18 at the time of his or her entry into the territory of a Member State and of the introduction of his or her asylum application in that State, but who, in the course of the asylum procedure, attains the age of majority and is thereafter granted refugee status must still be regarded as a “minor” for the purposes of that provision.

The authorities followed an incorrect interpretation of the Dublin Regulation 604/2013 failing to take into account that the older applicant is the brother of the minor and should remain in Hungary under Article 10 of the Regulation, despite having lodged an application in Bulgaria.

Concerning the criteria of “filing the application” in § 75 S. 2 VwGO, the informal request for asylum according to § 13 AsylG must be taken into consideration as the relevant date and not the formal lodging of the application according to § 14 AsylG when the Federal Office fails to provide an opportunity to lodge an application. Otherwise, the work overload that the Federal Office is facing, would be a detriment for the applicant, both concerning the scheduling for the formal application and concerning the examination of the application. 

If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant  a further opportunity to be heard.

However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.

Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for international protection may rely, in the context of an action brought against a decision to transfer him, on the expiry of a period laid down in Article 21(1) of that regulation, even if the requested Member State is willing to take charge of that applicant.

The two-month period for submitting a take charge request where there has been a Eurodac hit is not cumulative with the general three-month period for take charge requests.

An application for international protection is deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared by a public authority and certifying that a third-country national has requested international protection, has reached the authority responsible for implementing the obligations arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the main information contained in such a document, but not that document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority.

In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.