Case summaries

A Member State is not required to issue a decision on its own responsibility under Dublin III when, in its capacity as the determining Member State, it found that there is no sufficient evidence to establish responsibility of another Member State. Domestic courts do not have to examine the application of the Dublin criteria ex proprio motu in the context of a review of the rejection of an application for international protection.

Religion is a broad concept that encompasses both internal elements of faith and an external component of manifestation. The applicant does not have to provide documentation and make statements on both elements but has to cooperate with the authorities and substantiate the reasons that his claim of persecution on the grounds of religion is true. The provision of the death penalty in national legislation could constitute an “act of persecution” on its own, provided that the penalty is actually enforced and regardless of whether the measure is considered important for reasons of public order in that country of origin.

CJEU rules on the correct processing of applications for international protection lodged separately by family members and the interrelationship between them.

The CJEU ruled on  the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the (Recast) Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.

In the absence of EU rules concerning the procedural requirements with regard to the submission and examination of an application for international protection, Member States must determine those requirements provided that they do not render in practice impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to seek asylum.

Neither the omission nor the delay of the Immigration Office can deprive an asylum applicant of the right to obtain the rehearing of their legal status in case of a change in the circumstances in their country of origin. 

Where a person is registered with UNRWA and then later applies for international protection in a European Union Member State such persons are in principle excluded from refugee status in the European Union unless it becomes evident, on the basis of an individualised assessment of all relevant evidence, that their personal safety is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions are compatible with its mission and that due to these circumstances the individual has been forced to leave the UNRWA area of operations. 

A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.

Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations. 

The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.

The case concerned the application of a take back request under the the Dublin III Regulation where an asylum applicant has lodged multiple asylum applications in two different Member States and is the subject of a European Arrest Warrant.

In the lack of audiovisual recording of the interview, the Judge must set the appearance hearing, otherwise being the decree issued null and void for the breach of the adversarial principle.