Case summaries
The extension of the transfer period in accordance with Art. 29 para. 2 sentence 2 Dublin Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation) requires that the asylum applicant absconds, which has to be proven by the transferring authority.
Absconding is only the case, if the asylum applicant cannot be reached by the competent authorities for an (undefined) longer period of time. The intention to evade the authorities does not have to be proven. The circumstances of the individual case are decisive.
The applicants’ personal circumstances and the general conditions in the country of origin have to be taken into account, when assessing whether an internal flight alternative exists. Relevant sources like the UNHCR guidelines have to be used. Otherwise this constitutes a significant procedural error.
When a refugee and their child apply for international protection, the Police Headquarters shall not make residence or parental relationship the conditions for submitting their application.
The Court decides that a beneficiary of international protection cannot be deported to a country in which the individual concerned faces a serious risk of inhumane or degrading treatment. The risk of destitution after deportation is only excluded when the receiving state authorities provide a specific, and not just a general, assurance to the individual concerned.
As a result of a transfer order to Italian authorities joined with house arrest, the applicant lodged an appeal. She argued she would be at risk of being exposed to inhuman and degrading treatments, as well as to systemic lapses of the Italian asylum system. In this case, the administrative tribunal granted annulment of those orders issued by the prefect of la Haute-Garonne in the light of the current Italian asylum conditions and the reasons motivating the applicant to reach France after having stayed in Italy.
The CJEU ruled on whether an individual could appeal a decision which refused refugee status but granted subsidiary protection status, even if the rights and benefits afforded by each international protection status are identical in national law.
A Member State is not required to issue a decision on its own responsibility under Dublin III when, in its capacity as the determining Member State, it found that there is no sufficient evidence to establish responsibility of another Member State. Domestic courts do not have to examine the application of the Dublin criteria ex proprio motu in the context of a review of the rejection of an application for international protection.
Religion is a broad concept that encompasses both internal elements of faith and an external component of manifestation. The applicant does not have to provide documentation and make statements on both elements but has to cooperate with the authorities and substantiate the reasons that his claim of persecution on the grounds of religion is true. The provision of the death penalty in national legislation could constitute an “act of persecution” on its own, provided that the penalty is actually enforced and regardless of whether the measure is considered important for reasons of public order in that country of origin.
CJEU rules on the correct processing of applications for international protection lodged separately by family members and the interrelationship between them.
The CJEU ruled on the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the (Recast) Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.
In the absence of EU rules concerning the procedural requirements with regard to the submission and examination of an application for international protection, Member States must determine those requirements provided that they do not render in practice impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to seek asylum.