Case summaries

The transfer of an applicant for asylum to Malta violates the Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (“Dublin III Regulation”) because Malta’s asylum procedures and system show systemic deficiencies with the inherent risk of subjecting an applicant for asylum to inhuman or degrading treatment.  

The rules of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (“International Protection Directive”) do not prohibit the review of an application for asylum in Germany in a case where an applicant has previously been granted subsidiary protection in another Member State, if such application for asylum has been filed before 20 July 2015. This is because the inadmissibility of applications filed before 20 July 2015 is governed by the Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (“Asylum Procedures Directive”). According to Article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Member States may consider an application for asylum as inadmissible if another Member State has granted refugee status, but not if another Member State has granted subsidiary protection. 

There is a real risk that, due to overcrowded accommodation, Hungary can no longer receive returning Dublin claimants. Because of inadequate shelter, the claimant and her two minor children may be subjected to accommodation conditions which contravene Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Before the return of a vulnerable Dublin claimant occurs, Hungary must first be asked to provide guarantees of adequate shelter. 

Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.

It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.

In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.

Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.

Whilst the Appeals Committee believes that the applicant was ‘wronged’ during the administrative procedures in the First and Second Degree (pursuant to Decree 113/2013), the Committee is unable to request a new personal interview, because no such provision exists within the national legislation (Regulation Service of Authority and Appeal 339/2013 opinion of the Legal Council).

If an appellant provides substantiated reasons that call into question the consideration of evidence in the administrative proceedings, the facts cannot be regarded as “well established on basis of the records in combination with the complaint”. Thus, an oral hearing has to be held. The same applies if there is a necessity to consider up-to-date country of origin information as well as an up-to-date medical report due to the long duration of the judicial proceedings.

In the opinion of the court, the absence of a legal representative in the oral hearing, in spite of an explicit request by the appellant, does not constitute a grave violation of procedural rules. The relevant provisions does not provide for any legal consequences for such failure to act. However, this interpretation is not mandatory due to the lack of explicitly regulated legal consequences and requires further clarification by the Supreme Administrative Court. 

The case follows on from litigation presented in M.A. v Cyprus and focuses in on the legal grounds for detention in Cyprus for an applicant who is subject to removal as well as an individual’s right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 

Upon preliminary examination, it cannot be excluded that a decision of an administrative court, limited to making a Dublin transfer conditional upon the assurance of the competent authorities in the country of destination that accommodation will be provided for the family in question, violates the right to an effective remedy under Art. 19(4)(1) of the Basic Law.

Since the removal might lead to severe disadvantages for the applicants which cannot easily be compensated for and which outweigh the consequences of a preliminarily prolonged presence of the persons concerned, the removal has to be suspended until the Federal Constitutional Court has reached its final decision. 

Where a foreign or stateless person is on the border and wants to apply for international protection, the competent authorities have the duty to give him information about how to access the procedure. The competent authorities also have the duty to ensure translation support in order to facilitate access to the procedure of asylum. If these duties are not fulfilled both the decree of removal and the decree of detention are void.

Detention pending Dublin transfer can only be ordered on the basis of Article 28 Dublin-III-Regulation, which contains autonomous provisions on the detention of foreigner. Additional criteria laid down by national laws are required in order to specify the condition of "risk of absconding". A deportation detention order that does not even refer to Art. 28 Dublin-III-Regulation is unlawful.