Case summaries
Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.
If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.
It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.
Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.
1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.
2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.
1. Do the ‘international obligations’, referred to in Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 1 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas cover all the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including, in particular, those guaranteed by Articles 4 and 18, and do they also cover obligations which bind the Member States, in the light of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees?
A. In view of the answer given to the first question, must Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas be interpreted as meaning that, subject to its discretion with regard to the circumstances of the case, a Member State to which an application for a visa with limited territorial validity has been made is required to issue the visa applied for, where a risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or another international obligation by which it is bound is detected?
B. Does the existence of links between the applicant and the Member State to which the visa application has been made (for example, family connections, host families, guarantors and sponsors) affect the answer to that question?
A Dublin Transfer to Italy should be prevented when the person concerned is a vulnerable person as per in Article 3 (2) Dublin III Regulation.
The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) because it failed to carry out a proper establishment of facts as required by the Dublin III Regulation.
The asylum applicant cannot be transferred to Bulgaria because he would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment pursuant to Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Hungary does not guarantee the respect of asylum procedures. The transfer must be halted in accordance with article 3 of the Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013.
The judgment’s motivation must be based on more than one source if others are available.
The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.
The transfer of asylum seekers from Belgium to Austria, under the Dublin Regulation, is contrary to the principle of due diligence, because the government has failed to obtain information on the effects of the moratorium of the processing of asylum applications in Austria.
The Court suspended domestic proceedings and referred the case for preliminary ruling procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Court asked the CJEU to clarify the substance of its ban on exposing applicants for international protection to ‘tests’ to substantiate their sexual orientation.