Case summaries

The Ministry of Interior is obliged to consider whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection are fulfilled even when the application for international protection is dismissed as manifestly unfounded when it is clear that the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his or her removal, and if the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application earlier, having had opportunity to do so.

A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

In an application for subsidiary protection made after a failed refugee claim (and after a Deportation Order has been made), the Minister has a discretion to consider the application, which he can exercise if there is new information or altered circumstances. The absence of such means that that the Minister is entitled to refuse to entertain the application; there is no automatic right to make such an application at that late stage of proceedings.

The term "act of persecution" within the meaning of the Qualification Directive requires that an intentional infringement of a basic right as defined in Art. 9.1 of the Qualification Directive takes place. If the applicant has suffered past persecution (before his/her flight), it is no longer possible to deny refugee status solely on the ground that an internal protection alternative had existed in another part of the country of origin at the time of the flight (change of legal situation in the light of Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive).   

The Ministry of Interior rejected the asylum claim of an Algerian woman who requested protection based on gender persecution by a non-state agent. The High National Court, on appeal, ruled that gender is considered as a “particular social group” and that it is not necessary that the persecution is carried out by state actors but also by non-state actors under certain circumstances. The applicant was granted Refugee status.

A judge considering an appeal against removal on Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) grounds had a duty to examine reception facilities in a child’s country of origin.

The applicant challenged his transfer to Greece from the UK under the Dublin II Regulation, on the basis that the situation for asylum seekers in Greece would lead to a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Court declared the application manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible, as it was presumed that Greece would comply with its obligations and would not refoule him to his county of origin Iraq. 

Examining the application as manifestly unfounded requires a three-stage test: (1) whether there is a risk of expulsion  abroad or extradition of the person, (2) whether the Applicant could have filed the application sooner, (3) whether it is obvious from the steps taken by the Applicant that they had filed the application with the sole intention of avoiding imminent expulsion or extradition.

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not have, for instance, extraterritorial effect in comparison with Articles 3 and 8 of the same Convention. The return of an individual to a country where he is threatened with constraints on his religious freedom, which do not reach the level of interference with his rights pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, is not in contradiction with the Convention. Such a return cannot even represent prima facie serious harm for the purpose of examining subsidiary protection.

The conditions for asylum seekers in Greece were at the time of the decision not of such a character that it would prevent transferring asylum seekers according to the Dublin Regulation.