Case summaries

Art 3 and Art 15 Dublin Regulation are only applicable if there exist compelling reasons to believe the receiving country is incapable of welcoming asylum applicants in appropriate conditions or if the applicants can prove that they personally risk being subjected to ill treatment or not benefitting fully from an effective right to asylum. In this case, the applicants had not demonstrated they were personally victims of ill treatment in Poland. Poland was considered to offer sufficient guarantees against deportation and for an effective and impartial asylum procedure.

The basis for  a person’s detention under  5(1)(f) of the Convention  is legally untenable when there is a lack  of  a  realistic  prospect  of  the applicant’s expulsion  and  the domestic authorities fail to conduct the expulsion proceedings with due diligence.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

A time limit of seven days to submit an appeal against the decision on a manifestly unfounded asylum claim is too short to ensure an effective remedy.

This case related to the conditions of detention at the Thessaloniki Aliens’ Police Directorate in Greece, the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and whether there was had been an effective judicial remedy to challenge his detention.

The Court found that there was a violation of Article 3 as the conditions at the detention centre were inhuman and degrading. The length of his detention violated Article 5(1) as it exceeded the time considered reasonable for the purpose of carrying out his deportation, given the Greek authorities lack of diligence. Domestic law in Greece was incompatible with the safeguards provided for in Article 5(4). 

This was an appeal against the decision by the Federal Asylum Office to transfer the first applicant to Poland and the second applicant, including their two children, to the Czech Republic. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and found the consultations with other Member States and the decisions of the Federal Asylum Office to be arbitrary, ignoring national legislation requiring one procedure for the whole family and violating the Dublin II Regulation’s emphasis on the necessity of maintaining family unity as well as Article 8 of the ECHR.

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) quashed a decision of the Finnish Immigration Service which, applying the Dublin II Regulation, did not examine the application for international protection and decided to return the applicant to Greece. The SAC returned the case to the Immigration Service for a new examination based on new evidence that was presented regarding the applicant’s health.

In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.

The decision of the asylum authority was annulled on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that an internal protection alternative existed. 

Subsidiary protection pursuant to Art. 14a(2)(b) of the Act on Asylum (serious harm consisting of inhuman or degrading treatment) may also be granted in so-called humanitarian cases. This goes beyond the scope of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive; however, it is compatible with the directive. In order to grant subsidiary protection in so-called humanitarian cases, the factual circumstances need to reach the standard set out in the judgment of the ECtHR, D. v. the United Kingdom.