Case summaries

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability. 

The case concerned Somali and Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya. Returning them to Libya without examining their case exposed them to a risk of ill-treatment and amounted to a collective expulsion.

The procedure of the Court did not include decisive evidence for an assessment of whether, as a ground for revoking protection status, the complainant represented a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic, thereby infringing the complainant’s right to respond to all of the evidence, under Article 48(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and under Article 38(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in conjunction with Article 13(4) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and Article 4(4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The basis on which the competent authorities reach a decision must be clear from the administrative authority’s file and from the court file, even where no explicit reason is provided in the statement of reasons for their decision.

The real risk of suffering the type of serious harm envisaged in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive (torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) may be established by an Applicant who proves that he is a member of a group systematically targeted for such harm and who does not put forward any other circumstances relating to his individual case. 

When reaching a decision, the Defendant should have protected the best interest of the child. Taking into account the fact that the Applicant is a minor and providing legal representation for a minor applicant, are necessary elements in the process of demonstrating and establishing the facts. The principle of protecting the best interest of the child has to be enforced when assessing the risk that the absolute rights of the child might be violated if he is returned to his country of origin and needs to be reflected in the Defendant’s burden of proof as well as in the rules and standards of  evidence (in relation to subsidiary protection).

The Defendant should already have started searching for parents during the procedure for international protection and not only once the procedure for removing the child from the state has begun.   

Threats and violence against a person’s family members can be considered as acts of persecution where that person is connected to the facts which previously led to the violence..

The Plaintiff needs to state all circumstances known to him in relation to his persecution; however he does not need to establish a material and legal connection between the persecution and the reasons for persecution.

The fact that somebody is a child in Afghanistan can mean that he belongs to particular social group.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary on the ground that Hungary would transfer the applicant to Serbia, which would amount to indirect refoulement in violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and held that, although Hungary can be assumed as a safe country, if an applicant gives individual reasons for why Hungary is not safe these must be examined in detail. 

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary despite the applicant’s claim that he had first applied for asylum in Greece. The fact that there were no fingerprints on EURODAC did not prove the applicant had never been to Greece and according to Article 16(3) Dublin regulation Greece’s responsibility for the application would only expire if the applicant left the European Union for more than 3 months. However, since a deportation to Greece would violate Art 3 ECHR, the applicant should be admitted to the asylum procedure in Austria.

The case concerns the extension of periods of detention while awaiting removal from Belgian territory with respect to an Iraqi citizen having served his sentence and having submitted a number of asylum applications in Belgium.

An acceptance by Poland to take back the applicants was invalid because the Austrian Federal Asylum Office failed to inform Poland of the fact that the applicants have the status of subsidiary protection in Austria. As long as the applicants have this status a Dublin procedure is impossible because they have a legal stay in Austria and cannot be expelled.