Case summaries

This case is concerned with whether the State Secretary for Security and Justice correctly argued that the medical report did not prevent the removal of an asylum seeker who was HIV positive.  

The Council of State of the Netherlands ruled that the State Secretary could not have relied on the medical report. Hence, the State Secretary failed to sufficiently investigate whether the applicant would find herself in a life threatening situation when ordered to leave the territory of the Netherlands.  

The detention of a Somalian national is declared by the European Court of Human Rights to constitute a violation of Articles 3, 5 (4) and 5 (1). The cumulative effects of the detention conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and the detention could not be deemed lawful due to the lack of an effective remedy during detention and insufficient justification under Article 5 (1) (f). 

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Bulgaria, and also overturned the placement of the Applicant in administrative detention for five days.

The court held that given the general state of reception conditions for asylum applicants in Bulgaria and the Applicant’s particular circumstances, in particular his physical vulnerability, there were substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for asylum applicants and that if the Applicant was handed over to Bulgarian authorities, his asylum application would not be properly examined or he would be at risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and paragraph 2 of article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”).

The judgment examined whether returns of asylum seekers to Bulgaria would be contrary to their Article 3 rights. The court held that the Bulgarian system has significantly improved since the UNHCR report in 2014 which prohibited returns of asylum seekers. As a result the returns would not be in breach of Article 3. 

The administrative court may not replace the State Secretary’s credibility assessment of the asylum claim with his own assessment. The administrative court can, however, express its opinion on the underlying facts submitted by the Secretary of State. 

The three cumulative prerequisites for an internal protection alternative are not fulfilled, as it cannot be reasonably expected of the refugee to settle in the proposed part of the country. The UNHCR’s reasonability test is comparable with the national legislation’s one and UNHCR defines the internal protection alternative as ‘unreasonable’.

Detention of migrants for criminal offences subject to return is lawful even if asylum-seeker status is subsequently acquired. The application of 2008/115/EC is then not mandatory and the detention’s duration is not addressed under Article 5 (1)(f) therefore is to be judged ad hoc.

The absence of an individual right of the applicant to challenge the determination of the State responsible to examine their asylum claim on Dublin II grounds does not prohibit the autonomous application of ECHR Article 8 to decisions to remove persons from one Member State to another. However, taking into account the significance of the Regulation and the need to preserve its effectiveness, an especially compelling case would have to be demonstrated to deny removal following a Dublin II decision. When the Secretary of State has certified such human rights claims as clearly unfounded, it must be shown that the same decision could have been reached on reasonable grounds by an immigration judge.

The concept of family life under Article 8 ECHR and under the Portuguese Constitution requires the existence of an effective connection between the individuals, which also presupposes the existence of a financial interdependency.

In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.