Case summaries

It is within the powers of the interim relief judge to order urgent measures to stop serious and illegal harm to fundamental rights of migrants in Calais.

Effective access to justice relies on an individual having a voice in the proceedings concerning him or her. Solely focusing on the credibility of the appellant’s account and not having regard to objective evidence testifying to the appellant’s vulnerability or the risk to the appellant of return to Afghanistan has led to the proceedings being neither fair nor just. A material error of law has therefore been committed. 

If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant  a further opportunity to be heard.

However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Section 5(3) Nr. 4 NÖ MSG, which excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from benefiting from social assistance out of the means-tested minimum income scheme when the person already receives social assistance covered by NÖ GVG is compatible with constitutional rights. It held that it does not constitute a violation of the principle of non-discrimination amongst foreigners. Given the provisional character of residence rights for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection such a legal rule falls within the wide margin of appreciation of the legislator.

1. Afghans who have worked for international aid organisations are particularly endangered of becoming victims of political persecution by non-state actors (e.g. Taliban) according to § 3 (1) AsylG in case of a return to Afghanistan.

2. There is no internal protection for these people. They cannot escape the clutches of non-state actors as these groups have a wide (information) network at their disposal and an increased interest in persons who have worked for international aid organisations.

The Court held that detention is considered to be arbitrary within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 ECHR, if the length of the detention exceeds what is reasonable for the purpose pursued. It is to be examined whether the authorities have acted with ‘due diligence’.

In cases, such as the present, where the detention has been upheld for a long period, although lawfully, authorities are required to take additional steps in order to proceed with an asylum claim more speedily. When the detained person can be considered as ‘vulnerable’ a higher level of ‘due diligence’ can be expected from the authorities. Even if the asylum claimant complicates the examination of his claim by not providing sufficient evidence, the failure of the authorities to take initiative to end the asylum claim, results in a violation of Article 5 § 1 ECHR.

Following the appeal of the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the order of the Regional Administrative Court, in relation to a challenge to the decision of the Polish Refugee Board, and set aside the aforementioned decision to refuse tolerated stay, dismissing the appeal in all other respects.

The court justified its decision with reference to the procedural errors of the Polish Refugee Board, which included failing to gather evidence in an appropriate manner and inappropriately establishing the facts relating to the Applicant’s children. 

The reduction in the financial allowance available to child dependants of asylum seekers was not contrary to the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.

The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences  (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR. 

The applicant is an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Bon Clan from Mesegawayn in the Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The applicant was originally in 2014 granted subsidiary protection by the Danish Immigration Service under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2). In February 2017, the Danish Immigration Service revoked the applicant’s subsidiary protection.

The account of the applicant regarding his original application was rejected by the Board due to a lack of credibility.

The majority of the Board found probable that the applicant’s daughter if returned to Somalia would be at risk of forced circumcision.

As the primary applicant, the child was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1). Consequently, the cohabiting parents were granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) with reference to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1 (A) 2 and 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, published on 22 December 2009 para. 9.