Case summaries

The Kenyan applicant was a potential victim of female genital mutilation (FGM) and she faced forced marriage upon return. The Court stated that even if there was a risk of persecution in case of a return to the country of origin, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate internally as it was feasible in the circumstances.

The Ministry of Interior rejected the asylum claim of an Algerian woman who requested protection based on gender persecution by a non-state agent. The High National Court, on appeal, ruled that gender is considered as a “particular social group” and that it is not necessary that the persecution is carried out by state actors but also by non-state actors under certain circumstances. The applicant was granted Refugee status.

The Supreme Court held, in light of a UNHCR Report concerning Colombian asylum seekers, that the burden of proof had been reversed; the High National Court had to establish that the Colombian authorities could effectively protect the applicant from the agents of persecution.

This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established.  When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity. 

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order 

The case addressed the absence of procedural guarantees in the context of appointing a Commissioner and assessing the applicant’s level of maturity with regard to the need for special treatment of an unaccompanied minor.

The lack of personal persecution of an alien applicant does not preclude the recognition of refugee status if it is shown that there is an objective and well-founded fear of individual persecution in the applicant's country.

The Court found that the decision of the Minister for Public Order was improperly reasoned in that itfailed to comply with the Administration's obligations to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, to consider the merits of the applicant's claims based on objective evidence, to conform with procedural guarantees when assessing applications by unaccompanied minors, and to interpret the applicant's claims within the true intended meaning of the words used. It found that the Administration had failed to investigate the applicant's risk of persecution on the grounds of his racial origins and membership of (participation in) a particular social group (young male Hazara) in view of the prevailing conditions in his country.  The contested decision was also defective because of a failure to examine the existence of conditions for protection on humanitarian grounds.  

If a subsequent application is based on “post-flight reasons” created by the applicant, he has to provide good reasons why he has become politically active or has intensified his activities.

As a rule, “post-flight reasons” which have been created by the applicant following the termination of an asylum procedure are not relevant for granting refugee status. An exception to this rule may be given if the activities which the applicant engaged in since he left the country of origin constitute a continuation of convictions which have been practiced before. However, activities which fulfil these criteria are not by themselves sufficient to constitute an exception to the rule. In addition the applicant has to provide good reasons to explain why he has become politically active or has intensified his activities after an unsuccessful earlier asylum application.

The principle of family unity, which is a general principle of refugee law resulting in particular from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is not applicable to persons falling within the scheme of subsidiary protection, as defined both by the Qualification Directive and by the internal legislative provisions which transpose it.

It is important to inquire whether there are elements relative to the situation of homosexuals in their country which enable them to be considered as forming a group whose members would face a risk of persecution, for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the authorities and society.

The applicant’s refugee status was revoked due to a change in circumstances in the applicant’s country of origin as per section 107 subsection 5 of the Aliens’ Act, where the applicant’s individual need of protection was assessed in light of the notable and established social change in Sudan.

This case considered whether or not a “family” could constitute a particular social group under the Refugee Convention. The applicant, whose family was implicated in a vendetta, had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her membership of the social group that is her family. It was held by the CALL that a family could constitute a particular social group.