Case summaries

The threat of punishment for an act that is regarded as a crime in the country of origin is not a reason for granting asylum.

For the purposes of the first sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83, a person receives protection or assistance from an agency of the United Nations other than UNHCR when that person has actually availed himself of that protection or assistance.

Article 1D of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive refers, merely excludes from the scope of that Convention those persons who are at present receiving protection or assistance from an organ or agency of the United Nations other than UNHCR. It follows from the clear wording of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention that only those persons who have actually availed themselves of the assistance provided by UNRWA come within the clause excluding refugee status set out therein, which must, as such, be construed narrowly and cannot therefore also cover persons who are or have been eligible to receive protection or assistance from that agency.

French legislative provisions concerning the non suspensive effect of the judicial remedy under the accelerated procedure are not manifestly incompatible with the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directives.  

Serious reasons have to be established in order to apply the exclusion clause in Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, i.e. the material and intentional elements specific to the complicity.

The involvement in a State regular police force does not constitute, in itself, the expression of political opinions or the membership of a particular social group.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the High National Court to refuse granting refugee status. The refusal was founded on the application of an exclusion clause. It was held that the applicant constituted a danger to Spanish security. This decision examined the conditions required to apply this exclusion clause, namely that it has to be determined that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that such danger exists.

A potential violation of Art. 3 of the Convention can be found when a person risks to be extradited to a country where practice of ill-treatment of detainees are reported by reliable sources, notwithstanding possible assurances by the involved public prosecutors of that country.

Given the irreversible and particular serious nature of the harm which might occur if risks relevant under art. 3 of the Convention materialise, an effective remedy to avoid such a harm within the meaning of art. 13 of the Convention requires both an independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim, and a remedy with automatic suspensive effect. 

This case concerned the application of the principle of family unity, where the sponsor had been granted asylum and subsequently acquired the nationality of the country of refuge.

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

Even though the threats did not originate from the political opinions actually held or imputed to the applicant, they have to be considered as persecution for political grounds within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as interpreted in light of Article 10.1(e) of the Qualification Directive, considering the nature of the persecutors, their goals and their methods.