Case summaries
LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.
The Applicant's claims that he would be in danger in Syria because of the civil war there were accepted, because he was a Christian and is considered an enemy by both sides and because he left his country illegally and applied for international protection. The Applicant's fear of being killed as a non-combatant in the civil war was considered to be well-founded. It was considered that there was a reasonable chance that he would be arrested and mistreated since the Syrian state would perceive him to have political beliefs since he had lived abroad and would be considered to be opposed to the regime. Internal relocation of the Applicant was not possible because if the Applicant were to return to any region of Syria he would be at risk of suffering serious harm because of the indiscriminate violence and also because the actor of persecution was national/governmental. The Applicant was recognised as a refugee.
The Applicant’s alleged risk of persecution due to his former employment with the Iranian Intelligence Services was found by the Court to be sufficiently credible to give rise to a violation of Article 3 if the Applicant were forcibly returned to Iran. The French authorities’ use of the priority procedure did not however violate Article 13 in the Applicant’s case.
It is impossible to advise the Applicant to request the protection of public bodies in a situation in which the public bodies obviously discriminate against a certain religious group. When examining the alternative option of internal relocation, it is necessary to assess the legal and factual availability in terms of the circumstances of the Applicant. It is impossible to build the protection proceedings on a testimony with partial inaccuracies and to revert to translated reports provided by the Applicant.
The Asylum Court violated the right of access to the courts by rejecting an appeal in a case where an application for family reunification had been submitted at an Embassy. The asylum authorities acted arbitrarily in assuming that there was no legal entitlement to a formal notification of the decision in writing on such an application.
The rules on safe third countries, according to which applications for international protection in the event of a threatened violation of Art 8 ECHR must not be refused on the basis of formal safety in another country, is to be applied similarly to the Dublin II Regulation. If the Applicant already has subsidiary protection in one Member State, in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation his application in a different State in which his son, who is a minor and entitled to asylum, is living, (in addition to the Applicant’s pregnant wife) must not be refused. On the contrary, this State must make use of the right to assume responsibility for the examination.
The ban on the introduction of new matters in appeal proceedings as stipulated in the Asylum Act does not violate the right of access to the courts contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as it represents a proportional restriction.
The Returns Directive does not permit an entry ban to be time limited only in circumstances where the recipient makes an application for such.
An adult man was granted refugee status with reference to his familial relationship with his mother.
This case involved a violation of the right to equal treatment of foreigners as a result of a rejection of the application for international protection and expulsion of the homosexual Applicant to Nigeria because of a failure by the decision-maker to make its own country determinations and to thoroughly examine the situation of homosexuals in Nigeria.