Case summaries

When a Dublin transfer does not take place within the six-month time limit prescribed in the Dublin III Regulation, responsibility for examining the application for international protection is automatically shifted to the Member State that requested the Dublin transfer. Moreover, the Court extends the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided in the Dublin III Regulation, specifying that an applicant for international protection can challenge a Dublin transfer before a national court by invoking the expiry of the prescribed six-month time limit.

In countries where there is a high prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), as in Nigeria, non-excised persons can be considered as having a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of 1951 Refugee Convention. Refugee status can be granted where there is a considerable risk of excision and insufficient protection against this threat.

Sending countries are under the obligation not to transfer any individual to another country if any reasonable doubt regarding systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State arises. The mere assumption that the country will comply with its obligations under international and European law is not sufficient and the sending country is under the obligation to comply with the precautionary principle and not allow the transfer.

The use of forged documents by asylum seekers, when attempting to flee from one country and seek protection under international law in another country, is not criminally liable, when it is the result of a well-founded fear for inhuman or degrading treatment.

NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.

The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. 

An applicant may not be detained with a view to carrying out a transfer under the Dublin Regulation, in the absence of objective criteria for assessing the existence of a significant risk of absconding, defined in a binding legal provision of general application.

The words "2, 4 and" and the sentence "This shall also apply in the cases of Section 3 para. 2 no. 1, if the decision is connected with the adoption of a measure terminating the stay". in Section 16 para. 1 BFA-Procedural Act (Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Verfahrensgesetz-BFA-VG), violates Article 136 para. 2 B-VG. The provision was repealed by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional.

Family unity and the best interests of the child are high priorities when applying the Dublin III Regulation.  A child who has applied for international protection in Germany but has members of his family in Greece is entitled to family unity with them in Germany. The Dublin III Regulation specifies that this transfer should be carried out within six months of a Member State’s acceptance of the take charge or take back request. The time period to transfer starts from the Member State’s acceptance of the request. The right of the asylum seeker to be transferred within said time-limit is a subjective right. Whilst Germany had accepted the take charge request they had only planned to transfer the applicants at a time after the six month deadline. An interim injunction was therefore necessary in order to ensure that the rights of the applicant were respected. 

The case concerns the validity of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the Receptions Conditions Directive in the light of Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.