Case summaries
UK Court of Appeal rules on the correct test to use when making a decision on cessation of refugee status.
The fact that a person has been the subject, in the past, of a decision excluding him from refugee status cannot automatically permit the finding that the mere presence of that person in the territory of the host Member State constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. A case-by-case assessment is necessary before a measure based on grounds of public policy or public security is adopted. This assessment includes weighing the threat against the protection of the rights of EU citizens and their family members.
Similarly, in order to adopt an expulsion decision with due regard to the principle of proportionality, account must be taken of, inter alia, the nature and gravity of the alleged conduct of the individual concerned, the duration and, when appropriate, the legality of his residence in the host Member State, the period of time that has elapsed since that conduct, the individual’s behaviour during that period, the extent to which he currently poses a danger to society, and the solidity of social, cultural and family links with the host Member State.
The fact that a person cannot be repatriated under Article 3 of the ECHR does not imply that that person should be granted a leave to reside in the host country by way of subsidiary protection under Directive 2004/83. The person concerned is eligible for subsidiary protection only if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate health care.
The State Secretary has to carefully weigh interests when deciding about the application of Article 17 (discretionary clauses) of the Dublin Regulation where it concerns an adult applicant whose family members are beneficiaries of international protection in this Member State. The fact that an earlier request for family reunification has been refused, does not imply that the potentially destabilizing effect of a Dublin transfer no longer has to be taken into consideration.
§ 104 para. 13 S. 1 of AufenthG (Residence Law) impedes the claim of a person with subsidiary protection for the assessment of a case of non-refoulment referring to the situation in the state of origin according to § 60 Abs. 5 AufenthG and Art. 3 ECHR in order to enable family reunion due to the lack of a defensible interest.
The UK Secretary of State for the Home Department’s (SSHD) refusal to accede to a take charge request of a stateless wife and her child in Greece wishing to reunite with their British husband/father in the UK is a breach of Article 7 Charter/8 ECHR (and Article 6(1) of the HRA 1998) on the basis that the SSHD’s decisions were disproportionate and not justified. Notwithstanding that the husband/father is a British citizen, the Dublin Regulation applies, notably Articles 9 and 17(2). In respect of Article 9 Dublin Regulation III, it can be relied upon even where an individual in receipt of international protection subsequently naturalises as a British citizen.
The complainant, an Eritrean citizen and a single woman with a one-and-a-half-year-old child, filed a complaint against the decision of the Danish Immigration Service to reject her application in accordance with the Danish Aliens Act art. 29 (b) as the Greek authorities had granted her refugee status in Greece, valid until 25 November 2017. The complainant referred to the UNHCR EXCOM-conclusion no. 58/1989.
The Board did not find that the general social and economic conditions for refugees with a residence permit in Greece – although difficult – in itself could lead to the complainant not being referred to Greece as first asylum country. The Board did not find that the complainant as a single mother with a one-and-a-half-year-old child was to be considered quite particularly vulnerable. Consequently, the Refugee Appeals Board found the conditions for using Greece as first country of asylum fulfilled. The case was, however, remitted to the Immigration Service by the Appeals Board in May 2018 upon the Service's confirmation that they would consider the application in light of the applicant's residence permit having expired in Greece.
The Court annulled the no. 10464/31.05.2017 Decision of the Director of the Asylum Service, on the basis of which, the restriction on the movement of applicants for international protection entering the Greek islands of Lesvos, Rhodes, Samos, Kos, Leros and Chios after the 20th of March 2016, was imposed. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the competent authority may not impose the contentious restriction on movement to applicants for international protection arriving in the Greek islands after the date of the publication of the judgment.
The rescuing actor is not only responsible for the search and rescue operations but should also consider the safety of disembarkation points in line with the principle of non-refoulement. The Open Arms ship conducted a reasonable assessment of the situation during the rescue operation, given that Libya could not be considered a country where the rescued migrants could be safely returned and Italy had already communicated an available place of safety.
it should be assessed whether the migrants – if rescued by the Libyan authorities - would have been taken back to a country where there are ongoing severe violations of human rights. In the case at issue, Libya has to be considered such a country. the rescuing actor is not only responsible for the SAR operations but also for the designation of a POS (place of safety) for the migrants to be disembarked at. the principle of non-refoulement had to be applied. the decision to communicate with the Italian authorities, which were the first interlocutor with the Open Arms during the entire operation, including during the disembarking phase, is considered reasonable.
An asylum applicant who is below the age of 18 at the time of his or her entry into the territory of a Member State and of the introduction of his or her asylum application in that State, but who, in the course of the asylum procedure, attains the age of majority and is thereafter granted refugee status must still be regarded as a “minor” for the purposes of that provision.