Case summaries

The House of Lords considered a number of issues arising out of the proposed deportation of three foreign nationals on the basis that each was a danger to the national security of the United Kingdom. The Court made three particularly relevant findings: (1) that Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention could be invoked to exclude an individual from the provisions of the Convention on the basis of acts committed after the applicant was recognised as a refugee; (2) Diplomatic assurances as to the treatment of an individual were relevant to assessing how an applicant would be treated upon return to their home State, though their assessment was a matter of fact, and; (3) relying on evidence obtained by torture in a criminal trial did not, as a matter of law, always amount to a flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR.

This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and the protection offered under this provision.

The Applicant appealed before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to reject his application for refugee status. The applicant, his wife and their children claimed asylum alleging persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group. Their claim was rejected at first instance on the grounds that the facts presented lacked credibility and the applicants could avail themselves of an internal protection alternative. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the decision of the High National Court was revoked and refugee status was granted.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

The Ministry of Interior is obliged to consider whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection are fulfilled even when the application for international protection is dismissed as manifestly unfounded when it is clear that the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his or her removal, and if the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application earlier, having had opportunity to do so.

A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

The judgment specifies standards for country of origin information to be used as proof in administrative and judicial proceedings. The evaluation report of the European Commission on the progress made by candidate countries is not intended for international protection proceedings, as these may only be used as supporting material together with other reports about the country of origin.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 20(1)(d) and Article 20(2) of the Dublin Regulation and the analysis of time limits under these provisions when the Member State provides for suspensive effect of an appeal. The time limit for the period of implementation of the transfer begins to run, not as from the time of the provisional judicial decision suspending transfer but from the time of the judicial decision which rules on the merits of the procedure and which is no longer such as to prevent its implementation.

In an application for subsidiary protection made after a failed refugee claim (and after a Deportation Order has been made), the Minister has a discretion to consider the application, which he can exercise if there is new information or altered circumstances. The absence of such means that that the Minister is entitled to refuse to entertain the application; there is no automatic right to make such an application at that late stage of proceedings.