Case summaries
Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.
The CJEU ruled that an asylum applicant may not be transferred under the Dublin III Regulation to the Member State responsible for processing their application if the living conditions would expose them to a situation of extreme material poverty amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR. In this regard, the Court held that the threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions. Correspondingly, national courts had the obligation to examine, based on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, whether there was a real risk for the applicant to find himself in such situation of extreme material poverty.
An act of absconding withing the meaning of Dublin III may be presumed when the applicant has left the accommodation allocated to them without informing the competent authorities, provided that they have been informed of this obligation, unless the applicant provides valid reasons for not informing the authorities.
The CJEU ruled that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to the Member State that has previously granted him international protection if such living conditions would expose the applicant to a situation of extreme material poverty. The threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity, going beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions.
The Court further clarified that this threshold also applied where there were infringements of the provisions of the Qualification Directive, including the level of the subsistence allowance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
Lastly, the CJEU added that the fact that the Member State that granted subsidiary protection systematically refuses, without real examination, to grant refugee status does not prevent the other Member States from rejecting a further application submitted to them by the person concerned as being inadmissible.
The CJEU clarified that the Schengen Border Code must be interpreted as not allowing Member States to equate an external border with an internal border at which controls have been reintroduced. So, the Return Directive’s exceptions for third-country national who crossed external borders do not apply to someone in the applicant’s position.
Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/86 must be interpreted as precluding the rejection of an application for family reunification lodged by a sponsor in favour of a minor of whom she is allegedly the guardian solely on the grounds of lack of official documentary evidence of the family relationship and the sponsor’s inability to explain the absence of such evidence being deemed implausible on the basis of general country of origin information.
Authorities have to take into consideration the specific circumstances of the sponsor and the minor, including the difficulties they faced during and after their flight from their country.
When deciding upon an asylum applicant’s age, authorities should assess the evidence in a holistic way, and not rely solely on medical examinations of the applicant. If, in the absence of sufficient evidence, authorities conclude that the applicant is an adult, they need to justify their decision by reference to the grounds for its conclusion.
The High Court granted an order under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that the scheme of “Right to Rent” set out in sections 20-37 of the Immigration Act 2014 was incompatible with ECHR rights, along with a further order that it could not be extended beyond England without a further evaluation.
A medical examination to assess vulnerability was requested by an applicant in administrative detention. This demand was not examined by the doctor in charge in the detention facility. Therefore, the court of appeal refused an extension of the applicant’s administration detention and ordered their release.
The difficulties in access to the regional telephone operating centers set up by the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) in order to obtain an appointment to register asylum applications leads to legal uncertainty for asylum seekers. This legal uncertainty violates their constitutional right to asylum, and therefore creates an emergency situation on which the Urgent Applications Judge can adjudicate.