Case summaries
The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.
The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.
If a subsequent application for international protection is submitted, the administrative authority must evaluate whether the applicant has presented any new facts that, through no fault of the applicant, had not been the subject of examination in the previous proceeding. Otherwise, the application is inadmissible and the proceedings must be stopped.
The administrative authorities, when carrying out an assessment of whether a subsequent application for refugee status is inadmissible (based on the same grounds), should compare the factual basis for the administrative case on which a final decision has been made with the testimony of the foreignor provided in the subsequent application and should also examine whether the situation in the country of origin of the applicant and also the legal position have changed.
Legality of detention in the event of imminent deportation to Greece, if the detention was imposed before the judgment by the ECtHR in the case M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (application no. 30696/09) and there is an enforceable expulsion decision.
This case involved a challenge to the transposition of the Procedures Directive into Irish domestic law which appeared to be barred by a special time limitation period of 14 days applicable to challenges to asylum/deportation decisions. The Court found that a Member State is entitled to apply a national limitation period even in respect of those cases where the Member State in question has failed properly to transpose the relevant Directive, provided that the limitation period complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The Court found that the strict 14 day time limit provided for in section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act, 2000, is not equivalent to the limitation period for judicial reviews in other broadly similar areas (generally 6 months) and is not effective because it is so short a time. In the circumstances, the limitation period could not be pleaded or relied upon against the applicants.
Based on new evidence (suspicion of trafficking) the Administrative Court returned the applicant’s case to the Immigration Service which had previously decided that Italy was responsible for the application according to the Dublin II Regulation.
The withdrawal of practical protection against deportation for subsequent applications is lawful and does not represent an infringement of the right to an effective remedy (Art 13 ECHR), if the legality of the withdrawal is examined by the Asylum Court.
The case concerned a subsequent application for international protection based on the right to a family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) The application was rejected as inadmissible by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) on the basis that Art 8 considerations were deemed not applicable in asylum cases. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) made two important findings. Firstly it held that even if an application was considered to be inadmissible, there was an obligation to evaluate the risk of refoulement under Art 33 of 1951 Refugee Convention. Secondly, as provided by § 14(a)(2)(d) of the Asylum Act, in exceptional cases, to grant international protection for family life reasons, these have to be accepted as new elements in subsequent proceedings.
This case concerned whether the provisions of the Reception Conditions Directive apply to subsequent asylum applications (fresh claims) as with initial claims for asylum. It was confirmed that that the provisions do apply.