Case summaries

During the refugee status proceedings, the administrative authorities should clarify on what grounds a foreign husband has received protection in another country. These circumstances should be assessed consistently in two countries.

There are no objective reasons why the respective positions of two individuals should be viewed differently merely because they have applied for refugee status in two different democratic countries that respect human rights.

The administrative authorities, when carrying out an assessment of whether a subsequent application for refugee status is inadmissible (based on the same grounds), should compare the factual basis for the administrative case on which a final decision has been made with the testimony of the foreignor provided in the subsequent application and should also examine whether the situation in the country of origin of the applicant and also the legal position have changed.

According to the Supreme Court, the Defendant failed to provide the Plaintiff with the basic procedural guarantees that are guaranteed to an applicant for international protection in the safe third country procedure as stipulated by the International Protection Act (ZMZ), as well as the Procedures Directive. Neither the reasoning in the contested act nor any other data in the case files show that the Plaintiff was given the opportunity to argue that the Republic of Croatia is not a safe third country for him before the decision to reject his application was issued.

Whenthe Defendant handed over the Plaintiff to the Republic of Croatia without waiting for the decision as regards the Plaintiff's appeal and application for an interim injunction, the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's constitutional right to effective judicial protection and legal remedy as stipulated in articles 23 and 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner to refuse to process the asylum applications of two nationals of Azerbaijan, with refugee status in Poland. The applicants claimed they were being watched by Azeri agents in Poland and felt unsafe there. The Court held that the applicants would have had to show that the Polish authorities were unwilling or unable to provide protection. In circumstances where they had not even reported their fears to the Polish authorities, the applications were bound to fail. The Minister had no jurisdiction to grant them refugee status pursuant to the provisions of section 17 (4) of the Refugee Act, 1996.

The Migration Board accepted the applicant and her children were in need of international protection as refugees in relation to Senegal but claimed that they could obtain protection in Nigeria (considered a safe third country). The Migration Court upheld the applicant’s appeal stating that once a case has been examined in substance in relation to a country of origin and protection needs ascertained it is not possible subsequently to refuse protection by referring to a safe third country. Cases concerning safe third countries must be dismissed in accordance with Art 25.2(c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive which is transposed into Swedish law by the Aliens Act (2005:716) Chapter 5 Section 1 (b).

The case concerned a subsequent application for international protection based on the right to a family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) The application was rejected as inadmissible by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) on the basis that Art 8 considerations were deemed not applicable in asylum cases. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) made two important findings. Firstly it held that even if an application was considered to be inadmissible, there was an obligation to evaluate the risk of refoulement under Art 33 of 1951 Refugee Convention. Secondly, as provided by § 14(a)(2)(d) of the Asylum Act, in exceptional cases, to grant international protection for family life reasons, these have to be accepted as new elements in subsequent proceedings.

Even if the conditions for considering a subsequent application as inadmissible are fulfilled, the Ministry of Interior is still obliged to consider whether the applicant is in danger of serious harm upon return to his or her country of origin.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

Traumatised people and those who have suffered otherwise psychologically and physically from flight behave differently when giving evidence compared with healthy people. This can mean that the full submissions relevant to asylum are not provided at the start of the proceedings or the traumatisation itself is not mentioned. These circumstances are to be taken into account during the ban on new evidence.