Case summaries

The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.

In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.

1. At present, a definition of what constitutes war crimes or crimes against humanity has to be primarily based on the elements of these crimes as determined in the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
2. In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.
3. As a rule, acts by combatants which form part of combat operations in an internal armed conflict, and which do not constitute crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity (under Section 3 II (1) (1) of the German Asylum Procedure Act), will also not constitute the exclusion ground of a serious non-political crime.

 This case concerned the assessment of the option of internal relocation within Sierra Leone in the context of a threat from a family member. The Court found that, provided that regard has been had to relevant country of origin information, there is no obligation on the decision-maker under Article 8.2 of the Qualification Directive to seek out specific information on general economic and social conditions in a proposed site of re-location in the absence of any specific objection on that basis being put forward by the asylum seeker.

Asylum applicants who have already been subject to persecution also benefit from the facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive in the course of the examination of whether an internal protection alternative is available to them.

The High Administrative Court decided that refugee status had been unlawfully granted to a Chechen. Regardless of the issue of whether Chechens were persecuted as a group, refugee status was excluded since the applicant had access to internal protection in other parts of the Russian Federation.

This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and the protection offered under this provision.

This case concerned whether or not a proper assessment of an internal protection alternative had been carried out. It was found that careful research had not been done regarding the question of whether a part of Colombia meets the internal protection criteria as set out in Art 8.1 of the Qualification Directive, taken together with Art 8.2 of the Qualification Directive.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.

This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.