Case summaries
Ahmadis, for whom the practise and possibly also the promotion of their faith in public are elements which define their identity and as such are essential, are very likely to be at risk of political persecution in Pakistan. The “relationship consideration” demanded by the Federal Administrative Court, whereby the number of members of a particular group is compared with the number of actual threatening acts of persecution, seems virtually impossible in this case.
The concept of a serious violation of religious freedom according to Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) does not simply refer to a serious encroachment on the freedom to practice one’s faith in private but also the freedom to practice religion in a public context.
The enforced renunciation of religious activities can constitute persecution. Since persecution may lie in the prohibition itself, the actual future behaviour of the asylum-seeker and associated involvement in the other legal interests of the party concerned (e.g. life and freedom) are not relevant.
Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) returned the case to the Administrative Court for reconsideration based on the applicants' change of circumstance (conversion to Christianity in Finland) which only became apparent during the appeal before the SAC.
The Administrative Court did not consider credible the claim that the applicant’s conversion to Christianity had come to the attention of the Afghan authorities. The Court held that even if this information had reached the authorities, the applicant would not be at risk on return.
The Iranian applicants’ asylum claim was rejected by the authorities as they were not found credible. As a result of this finding, the authorities did not consider their account in light of the country of origin information on Iran. The court quashed the decision and granted refugee status to the family reasoning that the authorities are obliged to carry out a thorough and complete fact assessment.
It was found that the contradictions in the applicants' account were not relevant from the point of view of international protection. The court also ruled that the authority is obliged to clarify misunderstandings at hearings, at the same time applicants have to be given the opportunity to justify contradictions and incoherencies in their statements.
The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.
A young Christian man who had not been in his country of origin since childhood was not considered eligible for a residence permit based on exceptionally distressing circumstances in spite of the fact that his family resides in Sweden and that he is likely to face social difficulties on his return.
It is necessary to distinguish between the legal requirement to register a religious group under the law of the country of origin and enforcing such a registration with reasonable instruments permitted by the law, and the repressive actions of security units or other bodies of public authority towards members of a religious group that represent obvious excesses beyond the sphere of provisions permitted by law and which, at the same time, may, depending on particular circumstances, individually or on a cumulative basis, reach the intensity of persecution.
This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:
- Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
- Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.