Case summaries

The accusation of a breach of the individual's right to information about the rules and procedures of the refugee status proceedings and about the rights and obligations of the applicant was unfounded, as the application form for refugee status contained this information and was signed by the individual in question to acknowledge that she had been duly informed.

For refugee status to be recognised on grounds of a risk of persecution by non-state actors, it needs to be shown that this risk is linked to persecution grounds listed in the Convention.

'Women subject to domestic violence' do not constitute a social group. The assessment of whether women in Russia constitute a social group within the meaning of the Convention requires an assessment of the actual situation in the country of origin.

The Applicant appealed before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to reject his application for refugee status. The applicant, his wife and their children claimed asylum alleging persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group. Their claim was rejected at first instance on the grounds that the facts presented lacked credibility and the applicants could avail themselves of an internal protection alternative. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the decision of the High National Court was revoked and refugee status was granted.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

A permit to stay, granted on humanitarian grounds to a foreigner whose application for asylum has been rejected until such time as it becomes feasible for him to go abroad, is of a temporary nature. It is possible to extend the validity of such a permit if there are exceptional circumstances relating to the prevailing situation in the foreigner's country of origin and/or relating to his personal circumstances. When an application to extend a permit to stay is submitted, the Administration should examine any exceptional grounds that may have been put forward.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

This concerned whether the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) were required to make an assessment of subsidiary protection, and whether ORAC were obliged to examine country of origin information in every case. The court found that ORAC were not required to make a subsidiary protection assessment. The Court held that ORAC were not obliged to examine country of origin information in every case.

The term "act of persecution" within the meaning of the Qualification Directive requires that an intentional infringement of a basic right as defined in Art. 9.1 of the Qualification Directive takes place. If the applicant has suffered past persecution (before his/her flight), it is no longer possible to deny refugee status solely on the ground that an internal protection alternative had existed in another part of the country of origin at the time of the flight (change of legal situation in the light of Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive).   

The Kenyan applicant was a potential victim of female genital mutilation (FGM) and she faced forced marriage upon return. The Court stated that even if there was a risk of persecution in case of a return to the country of origin, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate internally as it was feasible in the circumstances.

The Migration Board set out the burden of proof for presenting an internal protection alternative. The area has to be clearly identified as well as being relevant and plausible.

The Supreme Court held, in light of a UNHCR Report concerning Colombian asylum seekers, that the burden of proof had been reversed; the High National Court had to establish that the Colombian authorities could effectively protect the applicant from the agents of persecution.