Case summaries

The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.

This case concerns exclusion from refugee status due to the alleged participation of a civilian in war crimes. It was found that an act committed by a civilian can be a war crime if this act is connected to an armed conflict. In the course of an internal armed conflict, war crimes can be directed not only against the civilian population but also against combatants of the opposing party.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) to refuse to recommend refugee status on grounds of credibility. The refusal contained a finding which allowed an appeal on the papers only. The applicant sought to have this decision set aside by the High Court on the basis that an appeal without an oral hearing was insufficient as the report depended on a finding of a lack of credibility and thus required oral testimony to rebut this.

This case concerned the treatment of evidence from unaccompanied minors. The applicant was an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan. He claimed asylum on the basis of a fear of persecution both by the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal refused his refugee appeal on the grounds that the applicant was not credible and that his claim was not objectively well-founded. The Court found that the Tribunal Member had engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture in relation to the applicant’s prospect of State protection in Afghanistan, that the Tribunal Member had imputed expectations to the applicant without any consideration of the applicant’s level of maturity at the time, and that the Tribunal Member had failed to consider whether the applicant’s fears in relation to the Taliban were realistic having regard to his age, maturity and the particular circumstances in Northern Afghanistan.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

The protection provided by the 1951 Refugee Convention can only be afforded if it is established that the asylum applicant, for a valid reason linked to one of the grounds listed in Art 1A(2) of this Convention, is unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of the country(ies) of nationality or, for a stateless person, of the country of habitual residence. 

Academics are not a particular social group in the context of the refugee definition.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

“Good reasons,” as defined in Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive exist if a recurrence of past persecution is not expected and there is no enhanced risk of first-time persecution of a similar kind. At present, there are “good reasons” to consider persecution of Chechens who return to Chechnya, unless they belong to a particular risk group, will not be repeated.