Case summaries

Requiring a political activist to live away from his home area in order to avoid persecution at the hands of his political opponents has never been considered a proper application of the internal relocation principle. Indeed, the pitfalls of requiring a person to act contrary to his normal behaviour in order to avoid persecution have been further emphasised by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database).

The case involves analysis of Art 5 of the Qualification directive. The applicant converted to Christianity in Ireland.

The Court stated that when analysing the behaviour of an applicant in the country of asylum, in this case conversion to Christianity, the issue is how such behaviour would be considered in the country of origin. Also, that while the state is entitled to view some claims based on sur place activities with a heightened degree of scepticism, the question involves whether, objectively, the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.

The Court granted leave to the applicant for judicial review of the decision of the Minister for Justice to issue a deportation order.

An unmarried woman with a “Western“ lifestyle, who is not religious and has no financial means, is at risk of gender based persecution by non-State actors in case of return to Iraq (continuation of the court’s case law, compare decision of 26 June 2007. A 6 K 394/07)

When applying the exclusion clause of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Court has to inquire into the degree of personal involvement of the applicant in acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected. 

The applicant was granted a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. Based on up-to-date accounts of the security situation in central Iraq he was found to be at risk of suffering serious harm from indiscriminate violence in Baghdad, his region of origin, in accordance with Section 88(1)(3) of the Aliens’ Act. The ruling of the CJEU in Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (C-465/07) was taken into consideration in the case.  

The case considered whether the security situation in central-Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, met the prerequisites for granting a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. It was confirmed that the need for international protection must be evaluated not only on points of law but also on points of fact. Both the applicant’s account of prior events in the country of origin, as well as current country of origin information regarding the security situation, must be taken into account in the risk assessment. As such, the evaluation is tied to a particular individual and to a particular time and place.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court against the decision to reject his asylum application in the preliminary examination phase. The application was rejected based on the fact that the persecution occurred in the past, the applicant had no current need for protection, and that the circumstances in the country of origin had changed. The applicant appealed stating that he had been granted “prima facie” refugee status by the UNHCR in Benin upon fleeing Togo. The High National Court stated that UNHCR certification did not amount to sufficient evidence of individualised persecution.

When no travel documents have been submitted the applicant can be held accountable for his failure to do so according to Art 311 (f) of the Aliens Act as the conditions of Art 4.5 of the Qualification Directive have not been established. 

The applicant’s claim for refugee status was rejected as Convention grounds were not established, however, subsidiary protection was granted in the alternative by the court on the basis of grave human rights violations and the prohibition of torture (Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).

The court accepted the argument that by granting a lower protection status (tolerated status), even if the applicant qualifies for subsidiary protection, the asylum authority violates Art 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (Art 61 (b) and (c) of the Asylum Act)