Case summaries

The applicant was granted refugee status because of political activities in exile. In the case of applicants from Ethiopia, a risk of persecution is not restricted to leading personalities of the opposition in exile as the Ethiopian government has shown an interest in recording the names and functions of all political opponents.

The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.

The applicant could not provide sufficient proof of her claims that she had been subject to honour-related violence. The information was not found credible and did not constitute a permanent impediment for the enforcement of an expulsion order.

The case concerned an appeal before the Supreme Court lodged by the Attorney General against the decision of the High National Court to grant refugee status. Status was granted to a Moroccan army deserter on the basis of a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. At issue on appeal was whether refugee status was granted based upon a fear of persecution resulting from the army desertion (which took place in Morocco), or due to the imputed political opinions that had arisen since his desertion (which arose in Spain): i.e. whether the applicant was a refugee sur place.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

Art 5 of the Qualification Directive does not require that the relevant activity, in relation to a sur place claim that gives rise to well-founded fear of persecution, is a continuation of previous activities performed in the country of origin.

If a subsequent asylum application is based on circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision, refugee status shall not be granted if the applicant was able to develop his own political conviction at the time of the (termination of the) preceding asylum procedure. This can be assumed to be the case at the age of 16, or at the age of 18 at the latest.

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.

This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established.  When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity. 

The case concerned an accelerated procedure decision. The applicant, an Uzbek national, claimed asylum only after he feared removal from the Czech Republic, his application was therefore rejected as unfounded by the Ministry of the Interior. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and set a three condition test to be applied in order to determine when an application is unfounded. The SAC also pointed out that the grounds for applying for international protection can be based on events which had taken place since the applicant left the country of origin.