Case summaries

Prostitutes who come from the State of Edo, and who are both victims of human trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks, form a group whose members are, by reason of these two common characteristics which define them, likely to be subjected to persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, without being able to avail themselves of the protection of the Nigerian authorities. They are members of a particular social group.

The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.

The question of whether the current situation in Iraq is an internal armed conflict (nationwide or regionally) according to Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive was left open. Even if one assumes that such a conflict takes place, subsidiary protection is only to be granted if the applicant is exposed to a serious and individual threat to life or physical integrity “in the course of” such a conflict. This cannot be established regarding the applicant in the present case.

The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

The applicant came from a district in Afghanistan, which according to up-to-date country of origin information, also contained areas judged as being safe. When considering internal protection for subsidiary forms of international protection, the decision maker must also consider whether or not the applicant is able to reach these areas safely. The roads could not be considered safe and the other presented routes were also not considered feasible for the applicant. As the applicant could not resort to internal protection elsewhere, he was granted a residence permit on the grounds of humanitarian protection in accordance with section 88 a § of the Aliens’ Act.

The High Court refused leave to apply for judicial review of a deportation order on the grounds that the decision of the Minister for Justice was reasonable.

The Court found that the province of Ghazni, Afghanistan was still unstable and unsafe for the local population due to the presence of an internal armed conflict. However the security situation in Kabul had not deteriorated to the extent to be classified as an internal armed conflict.

The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.

Rights violations resulting from a forced marriage, including the use of physical and mental violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights in terms of Art 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.

The Iranian state is neither able nor willing to protect women against persecution by relatives in case of forced marriage.

The applicant based her claim for asylum on the threats and human rights violations arising as a result of her common-law husband’s political activities and the authorities’ suspicion of the applicant’s support of the opposition party. Refugee status was refused. The Administrative Court found that the applicant had failed to establish a risk of persecution based on her imputed political opinion. The Administrative Court held, that to return the applicant to her country of origin where she has experienced serious human rights violations, in the final stages of pregnancy or with a newborn child, without any social networks to fall back on, taken into account together, would form a real threat of serious harm suffering inhuman or degrading treatment as laid out in Art 88 of the Aliens Act.