Case summaries

In the case of a Palestinian stateless asylum-seeker from Lebanon, the Court found the objection of the OIN (that was otherwise unverified by documents and based on which the decision to reject was made) to be unfounded, and recognised the Applicant as refugee. The Court emphasized that any procedure where the contents of the objection concerning a matter of national security are not subject to review, is arbitrary and seriously contradicts the principles of the rule of law as it makes the right to an effective remedy meaningless.

The Court recognised the Applicant as a refugee because he would be at risk of persecution due to his political opinions upon returning to his home country.

Persecution at the hands of political authorities acting for political reasons and with a political objective although not arising from the actual or imputed opinions of the individual concerned.

Refugee status was granted to the applicants (parents) because of their advocacy in Afghanistan for democracy, separation of state and religion, equality between men and women, and their membership of and support for the party “Comprehensive movement for democracy and progress in Afghanistan”. Refugee status was granted to their children because of their membership of a particular social group of “family”.

Threats by political opponents are to be considered as imminent persecution by non-State actors according to Art. 60 (1) sentence 4 (c) of the Residence Act in conjunction with Art. 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive. The Afghan State is unwilling and unable to grant protection against such persecution by non-State actors (Art 7 of the Qualification Directive).

The guidance in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) should be applied, by analogy, in cases where the applicant feared persecution on account of their religion. Consequently, the Tribunal had to consider the reason why an Ahmadi applicant for asylum had modified his behaviour by preaching only to people who would not put him at risk of persecution.

It is in principle possible for men to be persecuted on account of their gender. However, classifying the punishment for extramarital sex in Afghanistan as persecution on account of both membership of the group of men and the group of women would cover the entire society and renders the definition meaningless. Therefore, the applicant was not granted refugee status but his deportation was prohibited under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive.

This case concerned a Chinese applicant of Uyghur ethnicity who was granted residence and refugee status because of his sur place political activities in Sweden.

The Iranian applicants’ asylum claim was rejected by the authorities as they were not found credible. As a result of this finding, the authorities did not consider their account in light of the country of origin information on Iran. The court quashed the decision and granted refugee status to the family reasoning that the authorities are obliged to carry out a thorough and complete fact assessment.

It was found that the contradictions in the applicants' account were not relevant from the point of view of international protection. The court also ruled that the authority is obliged to clarify misunderstandings at hearings, at the same time applicants have to be given the opportunity to justify contradictions and incoherencies in their statements.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court against the decision to reject his asylum application in the preliminary examination phase. The application was rejected based on the fact that the persecution occurred in the past, the applicant had no current need for protection, and that the circumstances in the country of origin had changed. The applicant appealed stating that he had been granted “prima facie” refugee status by the UNHCR in Benin upon fleeing Togo. The High National Court stated that UNHCR certification did not amount to sufficient evidence of individualised persecution.

Given the situation of particular vulnerability and constraint of the applicant, a former child soldier from the DRC, there is no reason to apply any of the exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention to him.