Case summaries

The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.

The Court ruled that Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip can no longer count on the UNRWA’s protection or assistance. Therefore, the applicant does not fall within the scope of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention and must be recognized as a refugee. 

Except for very limited exceptions, the statutory three-year waiting period for family reunification of persons granted ‘temporary protection’ does not allow for an individualised assessment of the interest of family unity in light of the concrete situation of the persons concerned. Eventually the Court finds a violation of Article 8 of the Convention since the measure (whose goal is not otherwise challenged) had a disproportionate impact in the case at hand.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.

Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).

The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly." 

The CALL required specific facts to be attributable to the Applicant and the existence of a high threshold of seriousness in order to make a finding of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In this case the CALL refused to exclude the refugee status of an Applicant who had a criminal conviction for participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

The exclusion of a person who had belonged to a terrorist organisation depended on a personal examination to see whether there were genuine grounds to attribute to him a personal responsibility as organiser, author or accomplice to serious crimes under ordinary law or actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

This case concerned the revocation of asylum and refugee status in the case of a former official of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (following the European Court of Justice case of Federal Republic of Germany v B (C-57/09) and D (C-101/09), 09 November 2010).

The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.