Case summaries

The applicant, an Algerian national convicted in France for terrorism and banned from entering French territory in 2006, was sent back to Algeria in 2014, on the day he was notified of the rejection of his asylum claim and of the issuance of his return order. The Court found that the French authorities violated Article 34 of the Convention by carrying out the applicant’s transfer despite the Court’s interim measure. It also found that France violated Article 3, in the light of the general information regarding the situation of people suspected of international terrorism in Algeria.

Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department  that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters.  However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision. 

After having committed several offences qualified as being of a ‘particular gravity’, Mr.O’s refugee status was revoked on April 21st 2006.

Upon appeal to the Council of Alien Law Litigation (‘CALL’), the question of the validity of article 55/3/1 of December 15th 1980 law (the ‘1980 Law’) arose. Although it is established that this provision is transposing article 14(4) of the Directive 2011/95/EU, its compatibility with the Geneva Convention must be verified.

The Council refuses then to pronounce itself on the question, arguing the competency of such matter is vested in the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The CJEU in this case expanded on its previous ruling of B & D. Whereas previously the scope of the exclusion clause for those engaging in terrorist acts was limited to engaging in, conspiring to or planning an actual act of terrorism with an international dimension, the CJEU has now widened the scope to include those who provide logistical support even where no act of terrorism takes place. 

Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).

The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly." 

According to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court an oral hearing can only be waived if the complaint does not claim any facts relevant to the assessment which are in contradiction or go beyond the result of the administrative investigation procedures.

On the contrary, it constitutes a substantiated denial of the consideration of evidence by the relevant authority if a complaint questions the credibility of different sources which formed the basis of such consideration. The lack of an oral proceeding in such cases leads to a violation of the obligation to hold a trial.

With regards to a possible exclusion from asylum its severe consequences for the individual do not only require that the exclusion clauses of the 1951 Refugee Convention are interpreted narrowly but also that the facts are sufficiently established in order to determine which conduct the exclusion is based on and to weigh the reprehensibility of the offense against the need of protection of the applicant.

Considerations of the competent authority, which are limited to the assumption that the individual in question has participated in hostilities and has caused the death of opposing soldiers and civilians without further clarifying when,  on which occasion and under which circumstances such participation has taken place, do not meet the requirements for determining whether the criteria for exclusion are fulfilled.  

The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.  

The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.  

In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.

A stateless Palestinian woman from Syria who was registered with the UNRWA but who was no longer receiving support from the organisation was granted refugee status by the Migration Court of Appeal, and the case was returned to the Swedish Migration Board for re-examination of the period of validity of the residence permit.

The issue in this case was “complicity” – the Court analysed the facts of the applicant’s involvement in a violent paramilitary force in Iran to determine whether he was complicit in crimes against humanity, so as to be excluded from international protection.